Buffalo Law Review
Volume 37

Number 1

Article 7

1-1-1988

The Dilemma of the Downstream Plaintiff in an Interstate Water
Pollution Case
Steven Gaynor

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Environmental Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Steven Gaynor, The Dilemma of the Downstream Plaintiff in an Interstate Water Pollution Case, 37 Buff. L.
Rev. 257 (1988).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol37/iss1/7

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

COMMENTS

The Dilemma of the Downstream Plaintiff in an
Interstate Water Pollution Case*

IT

I.

INTRODUCTION

is in the beautiful Shining Rocks Wilderness Area of North Carolina
that the Pigeon River begins to flow westward, eventually crossing the
Tennessee-North Carolina border where it intersects the Appalachia
Trail near the Great Smoky Mountains Park.1 The river has many excellent fishing areas, filled with bass and trout which swim in clear waters. 2
Unfortunately, they are all located upstream, on the North Carolina side
of the border.3 Downstream, in Tennessee, the water is "foamy, smelly
and murky,"' the color of coffee.5 Only bottom dwelling fish like carp
and bullhead are able to survive.6 The Tennessee Attorney General's Of7
fice has declared the river to be unfit for any of its classified uses.
The source of the river's pollution has never been in dispute.8 It
* This research was sponsored in part by a grant from NOAA Office of Sea Grant, Department
of Commerce. The United States Government is authorized to produce and distribute reprints for
governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation that may appear herein.
1. Smothers, Industry andRiver Form a Gulf Between 2 States, N.Y. Times, January 31, 1988,
at A20, col. 3; Williams, Cleaningup Big Pigeon River, The Sunday Tennessean, June 28, 1987, at
H4; Petition of the State of Tennessee for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, at
4, Tennessee v. Champion Int'l. Corp., 479 U.S. 1061 (1987) (No. 86-57), vacating 709 S.W.2d 569
(Tenn. 1986) [hereinafter Petition].
2. Smothers, supra note 1, at A20.
3. Id. See also Petition supra note 1, at 4-5; 709 S.W.2d at 576 (Drowota, J., dissenting).
4. Petition, supranote 1,at 3. The River actually begins to become polluted in North Carolina,
approximately 24 miles from the Tennessee border.
5. Brief for the State of Tennessee at 12, Champion Int'l. Corp. v. EPA, 850 F.2d 182 (4th Cir.
1987) (No. 87-3529); Smothers, supra note 1, at A20.
6. The Asheville Citizen, May 9, 1987, at 1, col. 1; Smothers, supranote 1,at A20. See also The
Charlotte Observor, May 30, 1987, at Al, col. 4. Carp and bullhead are less sensitive to pollution
than trout and bass. Champion Int'l. Corp. v. EPA, 648 F.Supp. 1390, 1391 (W.D.N.C. 1986).
7. Petition, supra note 1, at 4. These are industrial use, livestock, watering, recreation, irrigation, and the support of significant fish and other aquatic life.
8. State v. Champion Int'l. Corp., 709 S.W.2d 569, 571 (1986), vacated, 479 U.S. 1061 (1987);
Smothers, supra note 1,at A20. See also The Charlotte Observor, May 30, 1987, at A4, col. 4;
Mountaineer, February 27, 1987, at Al, col.4.
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comes from the chemical waste discharged from the pulp and paper mill
owned and operated by Champion International Corporation in Canton,
North Carolina, approximately twenty-six miles from the Tennessee
border.9
In July, 1983, the State of Tennessee sought an injunction and civil
penalties against Champion in a Tennessee state court at Nashville.10
The complaint alleged that the company's discharges were not being adequately treated. 1 At the time the case was filed neither the federal government nor the state of North Carolina placed restrictions on the degree
to which "water may be colored or an odor created by a discharge." 2
Since the Tennessee Department of Health and Environment had issued
regulations with regard to these problems, all claims in the case were
based upon Tennessee law.13
In interstate tort cases, there is normally no prohibition against the
application of the injured state's laws to determine liability and afford a
remedy for acts done in another state.14 Champion had, through its discharges, diminished the recreational uses to which the Tennessee portion
of the Pigeon River could be put." It owned property in Tennessee and
9. The Pigeon River is clean above the plant; no other sources of pollution lie between Champion's discharges and the Tennessee border. 709 S.W.2d at 574. See also Smothers, supra note 1, at
A20.
10. 709 S.W.2d at 570.
11. Id.
12. Petition, supra note 1, at 20.
13. At the time the case reached the Supreme Court of Tennessee in 1986, North Carolina had
developed a narrative color standard; however, Tennessee laws were still more stringent. 709 S.W.2d
at 573.
14. Under traditional conflict of laws principles "the substantive rights and liabilities arising out
of a tortious occurrence must be determined by the law of the place where the tort was committed."
19 N.Y. JUR. 2D Conflict ofLaws § 38 (1982). The logic behind this rule is that the affected state has
a strong and legitimate interest in ensuring that injuries to its residents are redressed. International
Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 501 n.1 (1987) (Brennan, J., Marshall, J., Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See, eg., Young v. Masi, 289 U.S. 253, 258-59 (1933) ("The
cases are many inwhich a person acting outside the State may be held responsible according to the
law of the State for injurious consequences within it. Thus, liability is commonly imposed under such
circumstances for... maintenance of a nuisance."). A majority of states now follow the modem rule
which has been referred to as an "interests analysis approach." Id. Under this rule "[t]he local law
of the state where the injury occur[s] is most likely to be applied when the injury is done to land or to
a chattel that has a settled connection with the state." 1 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW SECOND:
CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 147 (1971). According to the SECOND

RESTATEMENT,

"when the tort rule is

designed primarily to compensate the victim for his injuries, the state where the injury occurred...
may have the greater interest in the matter." Id at § 145.
15. Smothers, supra note 1, at A20; see also Champion Int'l. Corp. v. EPA, 648 F. Supp. 1390,
1391 (W.D.N.C. 1986); Brief for the State of Tennessee at 12, Champion Int'l. Corp. v. EPA, 850
F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1987) (No. 87-3529).
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conducted business there.6 Under most circumstances there would be no
question that it could be made subject to the jurisdiction and laws of
Tennessee.17 Yet, the Supreme Court of Tennessee would rule that the
corporation could not be forced to comply with Tennessee laws."8 Ironically, it was a federal law, which had as its stated goal the elimination of
discharges of pollutants into navigable waters, 19 that shielded the defendant from liability for the consequences of its pollution.
In the early 1970s, the United States Congress became convinced
that improvements in water quality could only be brought about through
a vast expansion in the role of the federal government in water pollution
regulation.2 0 Accordingly, the Clean Water Act Amendments of 197221
(CWA) were passed, providing for a broad-based, multipronged regulatory and programmatic strategy for controlling the emission of effluents
into the nation's waters.2 2 Under the Act, it is illegal for anyone to discharge a pollutant from a building, structure, facility, or installation
without first obtaining a permit from either the federal government or a
state with a permitting program which has been approved by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).2 3 States are not allowed to issue
permits for discharges occurring outside their borders even if the pollution affects their waters.
16. 709 S.W.2d at 577 (Drowata, J., dissenting).
17. Id. See also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776 (1983) ("A state has an
interest in exercising judicial jurisdiction over those who commit torts within its territory. This is
because torts involve wrongful conduct which a state seeks to deter, and against which it attempts to
afford protection, by providing that a tortfeasor shall be liable for damages which are the proximate
result of his tort" (quoting Leeper v. Leeper, 114 N.H. 294, 298, 319 A.2d 626, 629 (1974));
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248, 255 (1984); Young v. Maci, 289 U.S. 253, 258-59

(1933);

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW SECOND: CONFLICT OF LAWS

§§ 145, 147; 19 N.Y. JUR.

2D

Conflict of Laws § 38 (1982).
18. 709 S.W.2d at 575.
19. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (FWCPA), Pub. L. No. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)). Major new amendments to this
legislation were enacted on February 3, 1987. See Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101
Stat. 60 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1987)). In 1977, the name was changed from the
FWCPA to the Clean Water Act mainly for political reasons. It was assumed that it would be much
more difficult to vote against a bill which contained an image which most people regarded as an
intrinsic good: "Clean Water." There were thought to be negative connotations attached to the
words, "Federal and Control." M. WARD, THE CLEAN WATER ACT: THE SECOND DECADE 5
(1982).
This Comment will refer to the FWCPA as The Clean Water Act unless citing to an earlier
version of it before the 1972 Amendments were passed.
20. See infra notes 68-98 and accompanying text.
21. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
22. See infra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
23. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
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Until 1981, Champion had been operating under a valid permit issued by North Carolina, whose program for pollution control had been
deemed acceptable by the federal government.24 Administrative proceedings for its renewal were pending when the State of Tennessee began its
suit.25 The Tennessee Court supported its decision by arguing that the
federal legislation in this area was sufficiently comprehensive to preempt
state law. Consequently, "one state may not take official action against a
permit holder from another state except as authorized by . . .federal

statutes. ' 26 According to the court, the CWA only allows the laws of the
state from which the pollutants are first discharged to be applied.27
Unfortunately, Tennessee is not the only state which has experienced this problem. In InternationalPaper v. Ouellette,21 a 1987 case,
riparian landowners in Vermont charged that the waters adjacent to their
lands had been rendered useless as a result of pollution emanating from a
New York pulp and paper-making plant.2 9 The United States Supreme
Court, adopting much the same reasoning utilized by the Tennessee
Supreme Court, held that the CWA precluded application of an affected
state's laws to determine liability for pollution caused by discharges
originating in another state.30 Seven years earlier, in City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois,31 (Milwaukee 11) the State of Illinois had attempted to prevent
the City of Milwaukee from pouring untreated sewage into Lake Michigan by basing its claim on federal common law. The Supreme Court
ruled that the 1972 Amendments had "so completely occupied the field"
as to supplant this means of redress.32
This Comment will focus on the ways in which these decisions have
limited the remedies available to downstream plaintiffs in interstate water
pollution cases. In particular, it will analyze the dilemma faced by a
party that finds its waters contaminated by an out-of-state business or
municipality which is in compliance with the Clean Water Act. Section
II provides background information on the history of the federal enforcement effort in the field of water pollution control. The key provisions
24.

State v. Champion Int'l. Corp., 709 S.W.2d. 569, 570 (Tenn. 1986), vacated, 479 U.S. 1061

(1987).
25. Id
26. Id. at 572-73.
27. Id at 575.
28. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
29. Id at 485 ; Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264, 266 (D. Vt. 1985), aff'd,
776 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1985).
30. 479 U.S. at 487.
31. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
32. Id. at 313.
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contained in the 1972 Act will then be reviewed in order to understand
how they were originally drafted and intended to function. Section III
examines the United States Supreme Court rulings in City of Milwaukee
v. Illinois3 3 and InternationalPaper Co. v. Ouellette.3 4 In Section IV a
two pronged attack will be advanced against the assertion which forms
the basis for both the Milwaukee II and Ouelette opinions: namely, that
the CWA is a comprehensive, long range, all-encompassing piece of legislation, designed to preclude every other avenue of redress except that of
the laws of the state where the pollution originates.3 5
It will first be shown that the Act was never intended by its drafters
to be all-inclusive. Legislators and expert witnesses who testified during
Congressional hearings expressed great doubts as to whether environmental laws in this area could be efficiently administered and adequately
policed.3 6 Resource and personnel problems were thought to be endemic
in the field of pollution enforcement.3 7 As a result, provisions were inserted which were specifically meant to preserve all common law and
statutory remedies which had been available to plaintiffs before the 1972
Amendments were passed.3 8 These parts of the Act were misinterpreted
by the Courts in Milwaukee II and Ouellette. It will then be argued that,
notwithstanding Congressional intent, the Act as administered in practice can hardly be considered comprehensive. Discretion is built into the
system at every stage, leading to uneven and inconsistent enforcement.3 9
Major forms of pollution go unregulated, and the system of enforcement-so crucial if the statute is to accomplish its goals-is on the verge
of collapse. 4° Dischargers routinely violate the law.4 1
In Section V, the Tennessee-North Carolina dispute over the Pigeon
River will be reviewed briefly. The case is instructive because EPA eventually disapproved North Carolina's state-issued permit, assumed permitting authority itself, and, in April of 1987, actually issued a draft
permit that met most of Tenessee's concerns. Yet, North Carolina's pollution continues. This is because the provisions in the Act that authorized EPA to take this action do not provide an adequate alternative to
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id at 304.
479 U.S. 481 (1987).
Id. at 492; City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 318 (1981).
See infra notes 232-78 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 252-56 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 133-47.
See infra notes 279-321.
Id.
Id.
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the equitable remedies previously available to downstream plaintiffs
under either federal common law or the laws of the affected state. Finally, this Comment will conclude that Congress should adopt legislation
which would either eliminate or reduce the negative effects of the Court's
rulings in Ouellette and Milwaukee II.

II.

THE CLEAN WATER ACT AMENDMENTS OF

1972

The particular water quality programs and regulations brought into
being in 1972 should be recognized as reactions by the Congress to the
serious deficiencies which had existed in the federal enforcement effort up
to that time. Only by studying preceding versions of the Clean Water Act
will it be possible to understand the intent of lawmakers in passing this
legislation. When taken outside of their historical context, it is quite easy
to misinterpret certain key language utilized by legislators during the
1971 and 1972 House and Senate debates. For example, previous events
in the field of pollution were so intimately connected and intertwined
with Congressional statements concerning the need for "uniformity, finality and enforcibility" 4 2 in the standards propagated that they must be
considered necessary constituents of these words' very essence.
A.

The Clean Water Act Priorto 1972

The Clean Water Act,4 3 originally named the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,' was enacted in 1948. 4 1 Under its provisions, federal
enforcement authority was limited to situations where a polluter had
caused a danger to the health or welfare of persons in a state other than
that in which the discharges first occurred. 4 6 In practice it was extremely
difficult to prove that a particular discharger was guilty;4 7 but even as42. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY Div. OF THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV. OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 1 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT

AMENDMENTS OF 1972 162 (1973) [hereinafter LEG. HisT. OF CWA].
43. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (FWCPA), Pub. L. No. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)). Major new amendments to this
legislation were enacted on February 3, 1987. See Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101
Stat. 60 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1987)).
44. See supra note 19.
45. Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (superseded
1972).
46. Id.§ 2d. See also Andreen, Beyond Words of Exhortation: The FederalPrescriptionfor Vigorous FederalEnforcement of the Clean Water Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV.202, 211 (1987).
47. Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement Provisionsof the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act" A Study of the Difficulty In Developing Effective Legislation, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1103, 1111
(1970). The fact that the discharger had to threaten the health of people in states other than the state
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suming that such proof did exist, there were still several obstacles to

overcome. The Act specified that the federal government could not bring
a suit against a polluter unless consent was first obtained from the appropriate officials in the state where the pollution originated,4" thereby, subjecting all federal suits to state vetoes.

The courts were also required to consider "the physical and economic feasibility" of pollution abatement in rendering their decisions.4 9

If a polluter could show that it could not afford to do business in any
other way, it might still obtain a favorable ruling, notwithstanding the
harm which its pollution might inflict upon the health of hundreds or

even thousands of people.50

The 1956 Amendments changed the law regarding state vetoes of
federal court action." The federal government could now obtain the required state consent from either the governor of the affected state or the
governor of the source state. 2 However, a conference procedure was also
added which effectively gave a polluter one year of immunity before any
suits could be filed. 3
In 1961 federal authority was extended to include pollution which
affected the source state's citizenry. 4 However, no enforcement conference
could be arranged unless the state's governor formally requested
it.5 5 The problem with this provision was that a state which truly desired
to eliminate the pollution would be much more likely to resort to its
historic police powers rather than submitting to the slow and cumbersome federal process. If neither the governor nor his top aides possessed
the necessary fervor to proceed against the discharger themselves, it was
highly unlikely that they would make a formal request for federal
intervention. 6
where the pollution originated represented a serious restriction on federal enforcement efforts. Many
intrastate bodies of water were effectively removed from the law's reach. Id. at 1105.
48. Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, § 2(d)(4). See also Andreen, supra note 46, at 211.
49. Id. § 2(d)(7).
50. Id. See also SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, STREAM POLLUTION CONTROL, S. REP.
No. 462, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947) [hereinafter 1948 SENATE REPORT]; Barry, supra note 47 at

1120.
51. Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, 70 Stat. 498, § 1 (1956) (amending
Water Pollution Control Act, § 8(f))(superseded 1972); see also Andreen, supra note 46, at 212.
52. Andreen, supra note 46, at 212.
53. Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, § 1; see also Barry, supra note 47, at
1108.
54. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-88, 75 Stat. 204,
§ 8(a) (1961) (superseded 1972).
55. Id. § 8(c)(1) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 4669(a)(1964)).
56. Barry, supra note 47, at 1114.
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The Act was amended once again in 1965.: The federal government
was now allowed to proceed against polluters without proving that there
had been an actual danger to the general health or welfare of a particular
community.5 8 The conference procedure was eliminated. 9 However, delays were still inherent in the system. For example, polluters had to be
notified of their violation 180 days before any formal proceedings were
brought against them." The Act still did not cover intrastate waters, and
the governor of the source state continued to possess veto power over
federal enforcement efforts if the pollution did not affect people living in
any other state. 1 The law did not subject a violator to fines for willfully
or negligently violating the law.6 2 The worst that could happen was that
the violator would be required to take steps to abate the pollution.
Before it was amended in 1972, the Act attempted to control pollution by resort to a "water-quality-standards-approach. ' 63 Under this
method, the water quality standard was set by reference to the gross level
of pollutants which a given body of water could accept without impairing
its use. When the amount of pollution was deemed to have reached unacceptable levels, regulators would then attempt to discover who the pollutors were, and the extent to which they were culpable.64
This strategy proved to be unsuccessful. It was often impossible to
estimate with any degree of precision the impact of any one discharger on
a body of water. Enforcement authorities lacked the scientific data on
which to base sanctions against alleged violators.65
B.

The "EnvironmentalDecade" of the 1970s

By the start of the 1970s it was readily apparent that the Act had
failed to deter pollution. In the twenty-two years since its passage, the
57. Act of October 2, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (superseded 1972), amending 33
U.S.C. § 466 (1964).
58. Id.

59.
60.
61.
62.

I
Water Quality Act of 1965 § 5(a) (adding Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 10(c)(5)).
See EPA v. California State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202-03 (1976).
See supra note 60.

63. See M. HoUGHTAN,THE CLEAN WATER ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1987: A BNA SPECIAL
REPORT 3 (1987); W. ROGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 354-58 (1971); M. WARD,
supra note 19, at 1-2.
64. See M. HOUGHTAN, supra note 63, at 3; W. ROGERS, supra note 63, at 354-58; M. WARD,
supra note 19, at 1-2.
65. M. WARD, supra note 19, at 1-2. See also ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, AIR AND
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL LAW: 1982 359-60 (1982).
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government had only managed to bring one case to trial.66 At the time, it
was estimated that approximately 1,400 communities and hundreds of
companies were regularly discharging untreated wastes into the nation's
rivers, streams and lakes.6 7 Much of this water was then severely polluted.68 According to one Congressional report, major waterways near
urban and industrial areas were "unfit for most purposes." 69 One-third of
America's drinking water had been found to be unsafe.7 0
Congress and the general public were becoming aware of these and
other environmental problems through a variety of established and
newly-formed citizen groups which were engaged in vigorous lobbying
activities.7 1 The expertise that representatives of these organizations were
66. 117 CONG. REc. 38, 799 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Muskie), reprinted in 2 LEG. HIsT. OF
CWA, supra note 42, at 1423.
67. 27 CONG. Q. 490 (1970). 60 million Americans were not even being served by any type of
sewer system. Id
68. See S. REP.No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEG. HIsT. OF CWA,
supra note 42, at 1425:
-Many of the Nation's navigable waters are severely polluted, and major waterways
near the industrial and urban areas are unfit for most purposes;
-Rivers are the primary sources of pollution of coastal waters and the oceans, and
many lakes and confined waterways are aging rapidly under the impact of increased
pollution;
-Rivers, lakes, and streams are being used to dispose of man's wastes rather than to
support man's life and health;
-The use of any river, lake, stream or ocean as a waste treatment system is
unacceptable.
Id.
69. Id. Lake Erie was considered by many experts to be dead or dying. Lake Michigan and the
other Great Lakes were thought to be equally eroded. The Potomac River, which flows through our
nation's capital, was receiving 240 million gallons of raw excretion on a daily basis, causing fourteen
foot piles of sewage and silty filth to build up in parts of it. R. SHERRILL, WHY THEY CALL IT
POLrIcs 189 (1971). The problem affected every area of the country. For example, the Chattaboock
River was receiving 40 million gallons of untreated municipal sewage each day, demonstrating that
the problem had not bypassed the South. Id The horrendous condition of rivers in the Northeast
was already legend. Samples taken from the Hudson River showed the intestinal bacteria concentration to be 170 times the "safe" limit set by EPA. 1 LEG. HIST. OF CWA, supra note 42, at 862
(remarks of Congs. Abzug and Rangel).
70. 1 LEG. HisT. OF CWA, supra note 42, at 862 (remarks of Congs. Abzug and Rangel).
71. Among the established organizations active in this field were the Audubon Society, the Sierra Club, the National Wildlife Federation and the Wilderness Society. Environmental Action and
Zero Population Growth, Environmental Policy Center, Environmental Defense Fund and the Natural Resources Defense Council had only been recently formed. The Ralph Nader Public Interest
Groups and, interestingly, the League of Women Voters also played leading roles. S. HAYS,
BEAUTY, HEALTH AND PERMANENCE: ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 19551985 460-61 (1987). The Environmental Defense Fund and the Natural Resources Defense Council
specialized in environmental litigation, and would bring a number of highly influential citizen suits
under § 505 of the CWA. The National Wildlife Federation also had legal defense funds. Id. at 480.
Victor Yannacone, Representative of the Environmental Section of the American Trial Lawyer's
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able to provide in testimony before Senate and House committees would
be of great use to key legislators, many of whom were already predisposed to reform the pollution laws.7"
Extensive media coverage of events such as the Santa Barbara oil
spill, the Alaska pipeline controvery, and the April 22, 1970 Earth Day
celebrations 73 galvanized public support in favor of tougher governmen-

tal action against all forms of pollution. A national poll taken by Louis
Harris in 1970 showed that a substantial majority of the public would be
willing to pay higher taxes in order to support strengthened federal water
pollution programs. 74 This was consistent with the results of other polls
Association, was involved in many of the leading environmental cases of the late 1960s and early
1970s. R. SHERRILL, supra note 69, at 277-78. In a speech given at Michigan State University he
gave voice to the anger he felt against those who were polluting the environment. His words epitomized the growing sentiment against, and awareness of, the dangers of pollution:
This land does not belong to General Motors, Ford or Chrysler; this land does not
belong to Consolidated Edison, Commonwealth Edison, or any other private investorowned utility company; this land does not belong to Penn-Central, B&O, C&O, Union
Pacific, Southern Pacific, or any other railroad; this land does not belong to American
Airlines, United Airlines, TWA, or any other common carrier; this land does not belong
to Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company, Minneapolis Honeywell, IBM,
Xerox, Eastman Kodak, Polaroid, or any other company marketing technological marvels; this land does not belong to International Paper Company, Scott Paper, Boise Cascade, Weyerhauser, Crown Zellerbach or any other paper products company; this land
does not belong to United States Steel, Bethlehem Steel, Inland Steel, Crucible Steel, or
any other steel company; this land does not belong to Anaconda, Kennecott, Alcoa, or
any other nonferrous metal company; this land does not belong to any soulless corporation.
This land does not belong to the ICC, FPC, FCC, AEC, TVA, USDA, BLM, Forest
Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, or any other federal or state alphabet agencyl
This land does not belong to the President of the United States [or] the Congress of
the United States.... This land belongs to its people. This land belongs to you and this
land belongs to me.
Don't just sit there like lambs waiting for the slaughter, or canaries waiting to see if
the mine shaft is really safe. Don't just sit around talking about the environmental crisis,
or worse yet, just listening to others talk about it.
Don't just sit there and bitch. Sue somebodyl
Id.
72. See generally S. HAYS, supra note 71, at 32; J. QUARLES, CLEANING Up AMERICA: AN
INSIDER'S VIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 8 (1976). At this point in time, a
number of Congressmen and Senators, quite sympathetic to the goals advanced by conservationists,
assumed crucial positions on the committees and sub-committees responsible for drafting environmental legislation. Among them were Senator Edmund Muskie, Senator Henry M. Jackson, Senator
Philip Hart, Representative Morris Udall, Representative Paul McClosky and Representative Paul
Rogers. W. ROSENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY 36-37 (1985).
73. J. QUARLES, supra note 72, at 12. On Earth Day thousands of people in cities throughout
the country held rallies to express their concern about the environment. Id.
74. Id. Since 1963 voters had approved every state bond issue for funding of water treatment
plants, usually by lopsided margins. Id.
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which showed that protection of the environment had become one of the

most important issues to voters.75

By the time debate began over the Clean Water Act Amendments of
1972, Congress and the Executive Branch had already enacted major
new legislation in other fields of pollution control. The National Environmental Policy Act, 76 enacted in 1969, mandated that all federal agencies
provide environmental impact statements whenever any of their actions
or legislative proposals were likely to affect "the quality of the human
environment."' 7 One year later the Clean Air Act Amendments of
197078 were passed, establishing nationally uniform air quality standards
for the control of air pollutants "which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger [the] public health or welfare."' 79 It was not long after this that
the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution and the House
Committee on Public Works turned their attention from the sky, and
began hearings on proposals to amend the CWA.8 0
C.

The Rivers and HarborsAct of 1899

On December 23, 1970, President Nixon revived the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899.81 This Act prohibited the discharge of any industrial "refuse" into the nation's navigable waters without a federal per-

mit.82 However, legislators would reject this law as an alternate avenue of
action against polluters.8 3

75. Id.
76. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4420 (1982)).
77. Id. § 4331. See also W. ROGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 698-99 (1977).
78. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1900 (1982),
repealed by, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1983)).
79. Clean Air Act § 108(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A). See generally Freeman, Air and
Water Pollution Policy in U.S. ENVIRONME AL POLICY 12 (1978); Tobin, Reviving the Clean Air
Act: Legislative Failureand Administrative Success in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1980s 22749 (1984). It was also during this period that the Environmental Protection Agency was formed. J.
QUARLES, supra note 72, at 16.
80. Many of the most important provisions in the CWA (1972), such as § 505, the Citizen Suit
Provision, draw extensively from the Clean Air Act. This is to be expected since the same congressional committees (House Committee on Public Works, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, Senate Committee on Public Works) worked on both pieces of legislation. See
W.RoGERs, supra note 63, at 355.
81. Rivers and Harbor Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982)). President Nixon issued Executive
Order 11574 establishing a mandatory permit system under the Refuse Act of 1899, for all industries
discharging toxic and other wastes into the nation's waters.
82. EPA v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 203 (1976).
83. 117 CONG. RFC. 38, 799 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Muskie), reprinted in 2 LEo. HisT. OF
CWA 1972, supra note 42, at 1257.
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The 1899 Act's deficiencies were many. It did not apply to the discharge of municipal sewage, 4 and contained no provision mandating
that polluters minimize effluent discharges.8 5 Proceedings could not be
commenced against industrial polluters until it was proven that their actions had caused the overall quality of a given body of water to fall below
certain minimum standards. Its primary defect, however, was that it had
come to be honored more in the breach.86 A study conducted by the
House Subcommittee on Conservation and Natural Resources concluded
that thousands of industrial polluters were simply ignoring the Act and
operating without permits.8 7
D. History's Lesson
The many years of ineffective federal policing of water pollution
laws had led environmental groups and key members of Congress to conclude that the statutes in this field would have to be revamped. However,
regardless of how well the new laws were drafted, there was a strong
possibility that the government would not be able to administer them
adequately. 8 Resource and personnel problems were endemic to this
area of law enforcement.89 In an attempt to supplement official government enforcement efforts, the 1972 bill contained a provision by which
private citizens could bring suit. Notwithstanding this innovation, it was
The almost total lack of enforcement encouraged governing bodies and officials to search

for other, more direct avenues of action against water polluters and water pollution
One such approach which has been focused on is the use of section 13 of the 1899
Refuse Act, which declares a prohibition over the discharge of any matter into the navigable waters....

Experience with the permit system during the past 10 months suggests that the machinery used to date may be as cumbersome as the 1948 abatement procedure. Estimates
of the number of permit applications to be received run as high as 300,000: estimates of

the time required to process the application run as long as 4 years.
Id.
84. State Water Resources Control Bd, 426 U.S. at 204.
85. Id. at 203.
86. Water Pollution Control Legislation: 1971 Hearingson H.R. 11896 and H.R. 11895 Before

the House Comm. on Public Works, 92d. Cong., 1st Sess. 232 (1971) (testimony of Mr. Topling,
Washington Representative, Sierra Club).
87.

HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, OUR WATER AND WETLANDS:

How

THE CORPS

OF ENGINEERS CAN HELP PREVENT THEIR DESTRUCTION AND POLLUTION, H.R. REP. No. 917,

91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
88. See Water Pollution Control Legislation-1971: Hearingson ProposedAmendments to Existing Legislation Before the House Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1164 (1971) (testi-

mony of David Zwick, representative of the Ralph Nader Group) [hereinafter Reopened House
Hearings].
89. Id.
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generally felt that the spirit and letter of the law would not be adequately
obeyed. 90 Unfortunately, future events would attest to the accuracy of
this view. 91
E.

The 1972 Clean Water Act Amendments

In 1971, the Senate Committee on Public Works asserted that the
Federal Water Pollution Control Program "[had] been inadequate in
every vital respect." 92 Much of the blame for this was placed on the
CWA's abatement procedures, which severely limited federal authority. 93
Improvements in water quality could not be brought about unless the
federal goverment assumed ultimate responsibility for regulating the discharge of pollutants. 94 Senator Muskie used the following apocalyptic
language in describing the situation:
Our planet is beset with a cancer which threatens our very existence
and which will not respond to the kind of treatment that has been prescribed in the past. The cancer of water pollution was engendered by our
abuse of our lakes, streams, rivers, and oceans; it has thrived on our halfhearted attempts to control it; and like any other disease, it can kill us.
We have ignored this cancer for so long that the romance of environmental concern is already fading in the shadow of the grim realities of lakes,
rivers, and bays where all forms of life have been smothered by untreated
90. See infra notes 232-78 and accompanying text (regarding citizen suit provisions).
91. Id.
92. S. REP.No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprintedin 2 LEG. Hisr. OF CWA, supranote
42, at 1423. The record showed an almost total lack of enforcement. Only one case ever actually
reached the courts under the procedures utilized prior to the 1972 Amendments. 117 CONG. Rc.
38,799 (1971), reprintedin 2 LEG. HIST. OF CWA, supra note 42, at 1257. See also Water Pollution
ControlLegislation,1971: OversightHearingsBefore the House Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong.,
IstSess. 11 (1971) [hereinafter House Oversight Hearings].
93. S.REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., Ist
Sess. 5 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEG. HSr. OF CWA, supra
note 42, at 1423.
94. See, eg., 117 CONG. REc.38, 797-98 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Edmund Muskie), reprintedin
2 LEG. Hisr. OF CWA, supra note 42, at 1254-55,
The water quality standards program is limited in its success. After 5 years, many States
do not have approved standards. Officials are still working to establish relationships between pollutants and water uses. Time schedules for abatement are slipping away because of failure to enforce, lack of effluent controls, and disputes over Federal-State
standards.... The committee believes the country should now move to restore and
maintain the natural chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters....
A direct link [should be established] between the Federal Government and each
source of discharge into the waters ....
[D]ual controls are incomplete and contribute to
uncertainty among all concerned... The Federal Administrator... [should be] responsible for control of any discharges of pollutants.
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wastes, and oceans which no longer provide us with food. 95
Congress responded to this challenge by passing the Clean Water
Act Amendments of 1972.96 This legislation was so sweeping in its reforms that it is more accurately viewed as an entirely new statute. The
Act consists of five titles. 97 Together, they form a vast penumbra of programs and authoritative rules, utilizing a wide variety of strategies for
remedying previous defects in the federal enforcement effort. The problem of pollution control is addressed comprehensively9 8 (if the word
"comprehensive" is defined narrowly to mean "includes much or many
things", 99 as opposed to "covering completely.")" ° In testimony during
the House and Senate hearings, it was noted that the bill, as eventually
enacted, was really not an all-inclusive piece of legislation containing no
interstices that other avenues of redress could help fill.10 1 Pre-existing
95. 118 CONG. REc. 33,692 (1972), reprintedin 1 LEG. HisT. OF CWA, supra note 42, at 161-62.
Senator Muskie commented:
[Today the rivers of this country serve as little more than sewers to the seas. Wastes
from cities and towns, from farms and forests, from mining and manufacturing, foul the
streams, poison the estuaries, threaten the life of the ocean depths. The danger to health,
the environmental loss can be anywhere.
117 CONG. REC. 38, 797 (1971), reprintedin 2 LEG. Hisr. OF CWA, supranote 42, at 1253. Further,
Senator Muskie argued:
Can we afford clean water? Can we afford rivers and lakes and streams and oceans which
continue to make possible life on this planet? Can we afford life itself? Those questions
were never asked as we destroyed the waters of our Nation, and they deserve no answers
as we finally move to restore and renew them.
1 LEG. HisT. OF CWA, supra note 42, at 164. R. SHERRILL, WHY THEY CALL IT POLITICS, 188-89
(1972).
Roving reporters from the Washington Star, after learning that many scientists concerned with environmental pollution fear that the 1970s will be the dawn of Doomsday,
went forth to discover the first cracks of that dawn; among other things, they found that
in Colorado's Eagle River fishermen... catch toilet paper, not fish.
Id.
96. Clean Water Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)). Major new amendments to this legislation were enacted
on February 3, 1987. See Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 60 (codified at 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1987)).
97. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1987)).
98. See generally I LEG. HIsT. OF CWA, supra note 42, at 343 (Rep. Young); Id. at 350 (Rep.
Blatnik); id at 374 (Rep. Clausen); id. at 380 (Rep. Roberts); id. at 425 (Rep. Doe); id. at 450 (Rep.
Reuss); id. at 467 (Rep. Dingell); id., at 481 (Rep. Caffery); 2 LEG. HIST. OF CWA, supranote 42, at
1302 (Sen. Cooper); id at 1408 (Sen. Hart).
99. 2 WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 550 (Unabridged ed. 1947) (Defines
"comprehensive" as "[i]ncluding much; comprising many things; having a wide scope.").
100. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 270 (1986) (Defines the adjective
"comprehensive" as "covering completely or broadly.").
101. See, eg., House Oversight Hearings,supra note 92, at 1748 (testimony of Richard M. Hall)
("Not every environmental problem is dealt with within the water quality standards, if for no other
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02
statutory and judge made laws were to be strengthened, not gutted. 1
A "Congressional declaration of goals and policy" was included in
Title I of the Act."13 Among the most important of these are the restoration and maintenance of the chemical, physical and biological integrity of
the nation's waters;" the elimination of all discharges of pollutants into
the nation's navigable waters by 1985105; and the establishment, wherever possible, of an interim water quality standard by July 1, 1983 which
would provide
for the "protection and propagation of fish, shell fish, and
6

wildlife."'

10

Title II requires states to develop comprehensive waste treatment
plans pursuant to federally issued guidelines for each area with "substanreason than our knowledge of the environmental harms resulting from our acts is imprecise and
constantly growing.").
102. 1 LEG. HIsT. oF CWA, supra note 42, at 481 (remarks of Mr. Stanton).
103. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1982).

104. Id. § 1251(a).
105. Id. § 1251(a)(1).
106. Id. § 1251(a)(2).
Title one states the following:
(a) The objective of this Act is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters. In order to achieve this objective it is hereby
declared that, consistent with the provisions of this Act(1) it is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be
eliminated by 1985;
(2) it is the national goal that whereever attainable, an interim goal of water quality
which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and
provides for recreation in and on the water be achieved by July 1, 1983;
(3) it is the national policy that the discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts be
prohibited;
(4) it is the national policy that Federal financial assistance be provided to construct
publicly owned waste treatment works;
(5) it is the national policy that areawide waste treatment management planning
processes be developed and implemented to assure adequate control of sources of pollutants in each State;
(6) it is the national policy that a major research and demonstration effort be made to
develop technology necessary to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into the navigable
waters, waters of the contiguous zones and the oceans.
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 (1987).
In 1987 the Act was amended, and a seventh goal was added to this section which stressed the
need to eliminate non-point source pollution. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1987). It should be noted that
the provisions in this section are only goals and not legislative mandates. 117 CoNG. REc. 325
(1971), reprintedin 1 LEG. HiSr. oF CWA, supra note 42, at 862. Critics of the zero-discharge goal
(§ 101(a)(1)) argue that its attainment would be prohibitively expensive, and that impractical objectives should not be included in the Act. M. WARD, supra note 19, at 9. However, at the time this
piece of legislation was passed, Congress did take the goals listed in Section 101 seriously. Senator
Muskie stated that the zero-discharge goal was not "merely the [type of]pious declaration that
Congress so often makes in passing its laws; on the contrary, this is literally a life or death proposition for the nation." 1 LEG. HIsT. oF CWA, supra note 42, at 164 (remarks of Mr. Muskie).
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tial water quality control problems." 10 7 These plans, which are subject to
the approval of the EPA Administrator,10 8 must include an estimation of
the municipal and industrial treatment needs of the region;10 9 the establishment of construction priorities for needed treatment works; 1 0 and
the formation of a regulatory program to assure that industrial and commercial wastes meet applicable pretreatment requirements. ' The Title
meet
also authorized $18 billion in federal grants to help municipalities
12
seventy-five percent of the cost of constructing sewer systems.
In Title III, the requirement that the government prove that a particular polluter caused the overall quality of a body of water to deteriorate is eliminated.11 3 Technology-based effluent standards are
established, which specify the maximum amount of water pollution permissible from any building, structure, facility or installation within a
given industrial or municipal category.1 14 These standards do not vary
according to the condition of the waterway which the discharger is using,
or according to the traditional uses of the waterway. '5 If the Act actually worked as intended, all steel mills of equal size would be treated
were disposalike regardless of their geographic location, provided they
11 6
ing of pollutants that were similar in type and quantity.
Under the Act, industry was to meet increasingly severe emission
limitations in successive stages. 17 By July 1, 1977, all point sources (defined by the Act as any "discernible, confined and discreet conveyance
from which pollutants are or may be discharged") 1 8 were to have installed the "best practical control technology currently available
[BPT]." 1 1 9 The second stage, to be completed no later than July 1, 1983,
contemplated the reduction of the discharge of pollutants to a level attainable through application of the "best available technology economi107. 33 U.S.C. § 1288(a) (1982).
108. Id. § 1288(a)(7) (1982).
109. Id. § 1288(b)(2)(A).
110. Id. § 1288(b)(2)(B).
111. Id. § 1288(b)(c)(i)(i).
112. Id. § 1288(a).
113. Id. § 1311(a).
114. Id. See also ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 65, at 159-79.
115. However, the EPA Administrator is authorized to impose even more stringent standards if
there has been "interference with the attainment or maintenance of the water quality in a specific

portion of... [a river, lake, stream, etc.]." 33 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (1982).
116.

Id § 1362(14); see generally A. STEWART & J.KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POL-

ICY: READINGS, MATERIAL AND NOTES 517 (1978).

117.

Id See generally A. STEWART & J. KRIER, supra note 116, at 515.

118. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1982).
119. Id § 1311(b)(1)(A).

1988/89]

INTERSTATE WA TER POLLUTION

273

cally achievable [BAT]." 12 Industrial sources which began their
operations after the Act had commenced were to achieve "new source
performance standards."1'2 1 The three sets of standards differ according
to the particular cost-benefit analysis
which policymakers must take into
122
rules.
up
drawing
when
account
Detailed regulations were to be published by EPA specifying the
allowable concentration of specific pollutants in the effluent discharged
by the various categories and classes of point sources one year after the
1972 Amendments went into effect.' 2 3 Dischargers found to be willfully
or negligently violating these standards would be subject to fines of up to
$25,000 per day or imprisonment of up to one year, or both. 124
The Act does recognize that technology-based effluent standards
will not always be stringent enough to ensure a minimum level of water
quality.1 25 In such situations, the 12EPA
Administrator may apply more
6
standards.
quality
water
stringent
Both water quality and technology-based standards are primarily

implemented through the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) found in Title IV.127 Under this system, it is illegal for any
person to discharge a pollutant
from a point source without first ob128
taining an NPDES permit.
These permits are issued by either EPA or states with NPDES pro-

120. Id. § 1311(b)(2)(A).
121. Id § 1311(b)(1)(B).
122. The difference between BPT and BAT is one of degree. Less cost-benefit analysis is permitted with BAT. For BPT the factors shall include
consideration of the total cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent
reduction benefits to be achieved from such application, and shall also take into account
the age of the equipment and facilities involved, the process employed, the engineering
aspects of the application of various types of control techniques, process changes,
nonwater quality environmental impact (including energy requirements), and such other
factors as the Administration deems appropriate.
Id. § 1314(b)(1)(B). In contrast,
The balancing test between total cost and effluent reduction benefits (with regard to
BAT) is intended to limit the application of technology only where the additional degree
of effluent reduction is wholly out of proportion to the costs of achieving such marginal
level of reduction for any class or category of sources.
Senator Muskie, quoted in A. STEWART & J. KRIER, supra note 116, at 525.
123. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1) (1982).
124. Id at § 1319(C)(1)(B).
125. Id at § 1312(a). See also, Note, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois: The Demise of the Federal
Common Law of Water Pollution,1982 Wis. L. REv. 627, 642-44 (1982) (authored by C. Dexter & A.
Schwarzenbart) [hereinafter Note I].
126. 33 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (1982).
127. Id. § 1342.
128. Id. § 1311(a).
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grams which have been approved by EPA 2 9 In the latter case, EPA retains the power to review, and ultimately to veto, the proposed permits if
they do not meet the minimum standards set by the federal government.' 31 While the original Act did not give EPA the power to actually
issue a federal permit if a state refused to submit a new or revised permit
which met EPA's objections, such authority was granted by Congress in
1977.
States are not permitted to administer NPDES outside their own
borders. Under the Act, affected states need only be given notice and the
opportunity to object to the proposed standards of a source state at a
public meeting.13 ' They are not provided with any veto power. 1 32 Their
only recourse is to appeal to the EPA Administrator who has the power
to approve or disapprove the permit. 3 3 The Administrator, may also assume permitting authority.
The dispute as to whether the CWA was designed to preserve the
laws of an affected state centers largely on the proper interpretation to be
given two sections contained in Title V. Section 510, containing the
"State Authority" clause, reserves to states and their subdivisions the
right to adopt or enforce "any requirement respecting control or abatement of pollution," provided it is not less stringent than the limitations
established under the federal act.134 This is true regardless of whether or
not the federal government or the state is administering the NPDES system. The question which the Ouellette Court had to answer was whether
this clause grants states the power to impose more stringent limitations
on discharges emanating from outside their borders. Section 505, "The
Citizen Suit Provision," authorizes citizens to commence actions against
dischargers alleged to be in violation of an effluent standard or compliance order issued by either a state or the Environmental Protection
Agency. 135 A party who brings a suit under this section may seek to have
civil penalties imposed on a defendant, as provided for by section 309(d)
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. § 1342(a)(b).
Id. § 1342(b).
Id. § 1341(a)(1)(2).
Id. See also International Paper v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 489-90 (1987).
33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) (1982). The Court in International Paper v. Ouellette would seize

upon the fact that the CWA grants affected states a purely "advisory role" in administrative hearings
in order to buttress their position that this law preempts the laws of affected states in interstate water
pollution cases. 479 U.S. at 489.

134.
135.

Clean Water Act § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1982).
Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982).
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of the Act. 136 However, any judgment finally awarded by the court must
be paid directly to the treasury.' 3 7 The plaintiff is only allowed to recover
"reasonable attorney and expert witness fees."' 3 8 He may not seek a rem139
edy in damages.
A "savings clause"'" was placed in the "Citizen Suit Provision"
which ensures that litigants are not denied the right to receive monetary
compensation for harm done to their waters. 4 ' It states that "[n]othing
in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of
any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including
relief against the Administrator or a State Agency)."' 42 If read narrowly,
this clause merely provides that the Citizen Suit Provision does not preempt other remedies previously available to plaintiffs in water pollution
cases; however, the Act as a whole may still preclude resort to certain
avenues of redress. 4 3 In a broader reading, the "savings clause" is applied to the whole statute:"4 all rights which affected parties had before
the Act was passed are to be preserved.' 4 5 The United States Supreme
Court adopted the former interpretation in Milwaukee II and Ouelette. 4 6
Arguments will be presented later in this Comment demonstrating that it
decided this issue incorrectly. 147
III.

A.

MILWAUKEE I, MILWAUKEE II, MILWAUKEE III,

OUELLETTE

History of the Common Law of Nuisance

One of the first cases which dealt with the common law of nuisance
in an interstate water pollution dispute was Missouri v. Illinois,148 de136. Id. § 1365(a)(2). See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 80, reprinted in 1972 U.S.
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3668, 3745 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 414].
137. S.REP. No. 414, supra note 136, at 3745.
138. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1982).
139. Id.; S.REP. No. 414, supra note 136, at 3745.
140. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1982).
141. See S. REP.No. 414, supra note 136, at 81.

142.

33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1982).

143. See, eg., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 328 (1981); Int'l. Paper v. Ouellette,
479 U.S. 481, 493 (1987).
144. See, eg., 479 U.S. at 492 (Brennan, J., Marshall, J., Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); 451 U.S. at 338 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
145. See, eg., 479 U.S. at 492 (Brennan, J., Marshall, J.,
Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); 451 U.S. at 338 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting).

146. 479 U.S. at 494; 451 U.S. at 328.
147.
148.

See infra notes 232-68.
Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
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cided in 1906. In that case, the state of Missouri sought to prevent the
state of Illinois from pouring "unpurified sewage and filth" into the Mississippi River. 4 9 While the United States Supreme Court did not specifically declare that there was a federal common law which existed in this
area, it justified federal jurisdiction because of the need to provide a forum in which to settle interstate disputes peacefully. 5
For the next sixty-five years the Court applied general principles of
jurisprudence in interstate pollution cases.1 51 These principals were not
dependent upon state statutory or common law. However, the Court did
not assert in any of these cases that it was creating or making use of a
152
federal common law of nuisance.
Erie Railroadv. Tomkins Sa did not disturb this trend. Justice Louis

Brandeis wrote that federal courts could not provide their own rules of
decision under a general federal common law.

54

Subsequent decisions

would make clear that this stricture was not to be applied uniformly in
all areas of the law. On the very day that Erie was decided, Justice Brandeis also authored the decision in Hinderlider v. LaPlata Co.,15 which

declared that "whether the water of a stream must be apportioned be149. Id. at 500.
150. Id. at 497. The Court returned to this theme in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Company,
206 U.S. 230 (1906), which was decided shortly afterward. It involved a suit, commenced by the
State of Georgia, to enjoin the defendant, Tennessee Copper Company, from discharging noxious gas
from their works in Tennessee over Georgia's territory. The opinion, written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, held that:
When the States by their union made the forcible abatement of outside pollution impossible to each, they did not thereby agree to submit to whatever might be done. They did
not renounce the possibility of making reasonable demands on the ground of their still
remaining quasi-sovereign interests; and the alternative to force is a suit in this court.
Id at 240.
151. See, eg., New Jersey v. New York City, decree modified, 290 U.S. 237 (1933), decree con.
strued, 296 U.S. 259 (1935), in which the Court enjoined the State of New York from dumping into
the ocean large quantities of garbage which subsequently floated into New Jersey waters and washed
up on New Jersey bathing beaches. The Court did not rely on either of the states' laws in reaching its
decision. See also Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); New York v. New Jersey,
256 U.S. 296 (1921); Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334 (1933).
152. See Note I, supra note 125, at 635-37.
153. Erie Railroad v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
154. Id at 78. Erie overruled Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), where the applicability of the
thirty-fourth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 (Rules of Decision Act, 28 USCS § 1652),
had been limited to "local statutes or local usages of a fixed and permanent operation." 41 U.S. at 19.
The section at that time provided "that the laws of the several states, except where the Constitution,
treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules
of decision in trials at common law in the Courts of the United States, in cases where they apply."
Idrat 18. The Court ruled that "laws," as used in this section of the Judiciary Act, did not include
decisions of state courts. Id at 18-19.
155. 304 U.S. 92 (1937).
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tween two states through which it flows is a federal question upon which
156
neither the statutes nor decisions of either state can be conclusive."
In Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp.," the assumption that federal common law should govern the use and misuse of interstate water
was called into question.1 58 The Court suggested in a footnote that state
nuisance law should be utilized to settle interstate water disputes between
a private company and a state.15 9 The uncertainty which this case caused
did not last very long. A few months later, Justice Douglas, writing for
the Court in Illinois v. Milwaukee (Milwaukee 1), declared that "[w]hen
we deal with air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is
a federal common-law.""16 This represented the first time the Court had
explicitly stated that there was a federal common law of nuisance which
was to be recognized as the basis for dealing with "the environmental
rights of a state against improper impairment by sources outside of its
domain." 1 61 The decision also contained the following ominous warning:
"It may happen that new federal laws and new federal regulations may
162
[sic] in time pre-empt the field of federal common law of nuisance."'
Nine years later, in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois163 (Milwaukee I1)the
Court would state that the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1972,
which were passed a few months after Milwaukee I, did exactly that.'"
This decision would render moot the difference of opinion that had exthe Milwaukee I ruling applied
isted among lower courts as to whether
61
parties.'
private
involving
to cases
156. Id. at 94. See generally Note, Preemption of FederalCommon Law-City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois, 31 DE PAUL L. REv. 201, 201-03 (1981) [hereinafter Note 2].
157. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
158. Id. at 499 n.31.
159. Id.
160. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972).
161. Id. at 107 n.9. The first federal court to explicitly call for the application of federal common law in interstate pollution cases was the Tenth Circuit in State of Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d
236, 241 (1971) ("Federal common law and not the varying common law of the individual States is,
we think, entitled and necessary to be recognized as a basis for dealing in uniform standard with the
environmental rights of a State against improper impairment by sources outside its domain.") This
case involved an action by the State of Texas to enjoin New Mexico residents from using chlorinated
camphene pesticide on their lands. Representatives of Texas had alleged in their complaint that,
because of rainfall carriage, such use might result in the pollution of the Canadian River.
162. Id. at 107.
163. 451 U.S. 304 (1980).
164. Id.
165. Milwaukee I involved a motion by Illinois for an injunction against four cities of Wisconsin
prohibiting them from discharging sewage into Lake Michigan. It remained to be decided whether
the federal common law of nuisance existed in cases involving defendants who were private parties,
or where the claims made by plaintiffs were for damages. The lower courts' answers to these ques-
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Milwaukee II

The defendant/petitioners in the Milwaukee cases were three municipal corporations organized under the laws of Wisconsin: the City of Milwaukee, the Sewage Commission of the City of Milwaukee, and the
Metropolitan Sewage Commission of the County of Milwaukee. 166 The
controversy centered around the sewage facilities which they were responsible for constructing and operating. 6 7 It was alleged by the state of
Illinois, as plaintiff, that discharges from these facilities into Lake Michigan constituted a threat to the health of its citizens. 168 After issuing its
ruling, the Milwaukee I Court remanded the case to a federal district
169
court where the dispute was tried on the basis of federal common law.
In 1977, U.S. District Court Judge John Grady, rendered a decision
stating that Illinois had proven the existence of a nuisance under federal
common law.1 70 The court found that the substantial quantities of sewage dumped into Lake Michigan each year by the defendants contained
enteroviruses and pathogenic bacteria which were capable of causing diseases such as polio, pleurodynia, myocardis, meningitis, and encephalitis. 1 7 1 There was considerable risk that Illinois residents who were
dependent upon the lake for their drinking water,1 72 or who swam in the
dons had differed from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See, eg., National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of
New York, 616 F.2d 122 (3d Cir. 1980); Bryam River v. Village of Port Chester, 394 F. Supp. 618
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Parsell v. Shell Oil Co., 421 F. Supp. 1275 (D. Conn. 1976); Committee for Jones
Falls Sewage System v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976); Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corpora-

tion, 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 912
(1980). The Supreme Court's pronouncement in Milwaukee II rendered these issues moot.
166. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1980).
167. Id. at 308.
168. Id. at 309. See also Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972); Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 154-55 (7th Cir. 1979).
169. 406 U.S. at 108. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in all cases in which a state is
a party. U.S. CONsT. Art. III, § 2, cl. 2. However, the Court is normally free to decide whether or
not to exercise original jurisdiction. 406 U.S. at 92. In Milwaukee I, Justice Douglas noted that
"Congress has provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1251 that '(a) the Supreme Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction of: (1) All controversies between two or more states.' "Id. at 92. However, he
went on to rule that the political subdivisions of a state were not to be considered states for purposes
of 28 U.S.C. Id. at 98. Consequently, the case could be remanded to a lower court. Id.
170. Chicago Tribune, March 28, 1984, § 1, at 2, col. 3; 599 F.2d at 170. The judgment of the
district court was announced orally and extemporaneously; consequently, references to this opinion

will come from the Seventh Circuit opinion or articles in the Chicago Tribune.
171. 599 F.2d at 167; see also Chicago Tribune, April 1, 1984, § I, at 1, col. 5; Chicago Tribune,
March 27, 1980, § 3, at 2, col. 1.
172. 599 F.2d at 169; see also Chicago Tribune, March 28, 1984, § 1, at 1, 2, col. 3. Lake Michigan supplies nearly all of Chicago's drinking water. FIELD ENTERPRISES EDUCATION CORPORATION, 3 THE WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 421 (1988).
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lake's waters173 might become infected. 7 4 Defendants were ordered to
achieve specified effluent limitations on treated sewage, as well as eliminate certain overflows which occurred during periods of heavy rainfall,
resulting in the discharge of untreated sewage directly into Lake
175
Michigan.
The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, which was a
qualifying state agency under the CWA, had already issued permits to
these facilities before the District Court ruling. Under this permit, overflows were not prohibited.' 76 All that was required was that the plants
provide a timetable for the additional construction which would be necessary to control (but not eliminate) sewage overflow. The defendants
contended that the 1972 Amendments to CWA preempted federal common law. Since the permits did not mandate that they eliminate overflow,
they did not have to comply with the court order. The Seventh Circuit
78
77
rejected this contention.' The Supreme Court reversed.
Justice Rehnquist wrote for the five-to-four majority. He began by
asserting that, under the Erie doctrine, federal common law may only be
resorted to when the Court is compelled to consider "federal questions
which cannot be answered from federal statutes alone."' 179 This is because federal courts are not general common law courts. Unlike state
courts, they do not possess a general power to develop and apply their
own rules of decision.1 80 Consequently, the standard to be used in determining whether a given statutory law has preempted federal common
law is not nearly as strict as the standard to be used in determining
whether a federal statute has preempted either state statutory or common
law.' 8' In the latter case, issues of federalism and states' rights are involved. Evidence of a "clear and manifest purpose" to preempt on the
part of Congress is required. This is not true in the area of federal common law. It is enough to show that Congress has "occupied the field
through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program." 182
173.
Chicago
174.
175.

The lake has many beaches. See, eg., Chicago Tribune, March 28, 1984, § 1, at 1, 2, col. 3;
Tribune, May 15, 1980, § 3, at 2, col. 1.
599 F.2d at 167-68.
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 311-12 (1981).

176. Id. at 313.
177. 599 F.2d at 176.
178.

451 U.S. at 332.

179. Id. at 312. See generally Note 2, supranote 156, at 215-18; Glicksman, FederalPreemption
and PrivateLegal Remedies for Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 121, 159-67 (1985).

180. 451 U.S. at 313.
181.
182.

Id.
IL
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According to the Court, Congress met this criteria when it enacted the
183
1972 Amendments to the Clean Water Act.
In the decision, the CWA was described as an "all-encompassing
program of water pollution regulation" in which "[e]very point source is
prohibited unless covered by a permit."' 84 Pursuant to the Act, EPA had
established effluent limitations for Milwaukee's sewage treatment plants.
These limitations were incorporated into the plants' permits. According
to Justice Rehnquist, Federal courts lacked the authority to impose,
through resort to federal common law, more stringent effluent limitations
than those issued by the agency charged by Congress with administering
the program.I 5 According to the Court, the overflows did not present a
different case. They were covered under the Act and had been fully addressed in the permits issued by the Wisconsin Department of Natural
Resourses. 18 6 The Court also concluded that neither the saving clause of
the Citizen Suit Section'8 7 nor the State Authority Section' impliedly
18 9
or expressly preserves federal common law.
Under the State Authority Section, states may adopt discharge limitations more stringent than those adopted under the Act, and a state
common law remedy may even be made available to plaintiffs. 190 However, this provision does not allow states to call upon federal courts to
employ federal common law to establish stricter limits than those provided for in the Act. According to the reasoning used by the Court, the
particular section authorizing citizen suits should be interpreted literally,
and cannot be read to mean that the Act, as a whole, preserves the fed19 1
eral common law of nuisance.
Justice Blackmun, in dissent, argued that federal common law had
not been preempted by the CWA. He took strong exception to what he
referred to as the majority's "automatic displacement approach." 1 92 This
type of analysis, he argued, failed to reflect the unique role which federal
common law plays in resolving interstate disputes.193 It also ignored the
183. Id. See generally Collins, The Dilemma of the Downstream State: The Untimely Demise of
FederalCommon Law of Nuisance, 11 ENVT'L. AFF. 297 (1984).
184. 451 U.S. at 318.
185. Id at 323.

186. Id.
187.
188.
189.

U.S.C. § 1365 (1982).
Id. § 1370.
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).

190. Id.
191.
192.
193.

IL See supra notes 140-47 and accompanying text.
451 U.S. at 334 (Blackmun, J., Marshall, J. dissenting).
Id
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fact that resort to federal common law was often necessary if the fulfillment of national goals, as expressed in congressional legislation, was to
be achieved. 94 According to Blackmun, evidence of specific congressional intent must be considered in determining whether federal common
law has been preempted by a federal statute. One cannot look only at the
"magnitude of the legislative action."19 5
The dissent further asserted that the saving clause of the Citizen Suit
Section indicated that Congress meant to preserve both federal as well as
state common law. 196 It was argued that there was nothing in either the
language of this section or the legislative history that would support a
different interpretation. Furthermore, the state authority section provides
evidence that the Act never intended to impose a uniform enforcement
structure in the area of water pollution.1 97 It was presumed that "more
stringent standards would necessarily be established by other statutes or
by common law." 198
In attempting to show that the CWA was not an "all-encompassing"
piece of legislation, Blackmun pointed out that the Act contained
no technology-based treatment requirements for combined sewer overflows. 199 The Administrator of EPA had determined that problems in
this area were to be resolved on a case by case basis.' °
The dissent concluded by predicting that the elimination of the federal common law of nuisance would encourage recourse to state law
whenever the statutory scheme was "perceived as offering inadequate
protection against pollution from outside the State."20 1 This is exactly
the strategy which the state of Illinois adopted. When the case was remanded to the Seventh Circuit, Illinois attempted to base its claim on its
own laws, which were much more stringent than the applicable federal
statutes.20 2 Two other cases involving similar issues were then combined
20 3
with it.
In the summer of 1980, Chicago beaches were closed an unprece194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 340.
Id.
Id.at 343-44.
Id.

200. Id.
201. I at 353-54.

202. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403, 406 (1984). See also Petition of the State of
Tennessee for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, at A-20, Tennessee v. Champion Int'l. Corp., 479 U.S. 1061, (1987) (No. 86-57), vacating 709 S.W.2d 569 (S.
Ct. Tenn. 1986).
203. 731 F.2d at 406.
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dented seventeen times because of high bacteria counts caused by overflow problems in the sewage systems operated by two Indiana municipal
corporations, the Hammond Sanitary District and the City of Hammond.2" Attorney General William J. Scott, suing as a citizen of Illinois,
brought a class action against them under both Illinois and federal
common law, claiming that discharges from the defendants' plants constituted a public nuisance.2 °5 The state of Illinois and the Metropolitan
Sanitary District of Greater Chicago filed similar complaints, but also
alleged a violation of Illinois statutory law.20 6
On March 27, 1984, the court ruled that the Clean Water Act precluded application of one state's law to determine liability and afford a
remedy for discharges within another state.20 7 All three cases were remanded to the district court with orders that they be dismissed. 20 8 The
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 20 9 However, in 1987 the
Court would rule on this issue in the case of InternationalPaper Company v. Ouellette.210
C. International Paper Company v. Ouellette
On July 5, 1978, the suit began as a class action by 162 owners of
riparian lands on the Vermont side of Lake Champlain, a body of water
which forms part of the border between New York and Vermont. 2 11 It
represented the third in a series of attempts by Vermont and its citizens
to obtain compensation and injunctive relief against the International Paper Company (IPCo) for its pollution of Lake Champlain.2 12
204. Chicago Tribune, March 28, 1984, § 1, at 2, col. 3.
205. 731 F.2d at 407.
206. Id. at 406; see also Chicago Tribune, March 28, 1984, § 1, at 2, col. 3.
207. 731 F.2d at 406.
208. Id. at 414.
209. Scott v. City of Hammond, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 469 U.S.
1196 (1985).
210. 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
211. International Paper Company's Motion To Amend at JA46, Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 602 F.Supp. 264 (D. Vermont 1985) (No. 78-163), aff'd, 776 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
212. See Vermont v. New York, 406 U.S. 186 (1972); 408 U.S. 917 (1972); 409 U.S. 1103
(1973); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'd, 414 U.S. 291 (1973). In
Vermont v. New York, the State of Vermont brought suit against the State of New York and IPCo
alleging that the discharge of liquid waste into Lake Champlain from IPCo's plant constituted a
nuisance. This plant was closed down in 1970, and was replaced by another plant which is the
subject of the recent litigation. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Aflirmance,
at 2, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (No. 85-1233). The State of Vermont justified the inclusion of New York as
a co-defendant because it was the owner of the land along the bottom of Lake Champlain, and was
the exclusive regulator of the waters on the New York side of the lake. Vermont v. New York, 406
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IPCo owns and operates a pulp and paper-making plant on the New
York side of Lake Champlain. Plaintiffs claimed that discharges from its

mill had so polluted the waters adjacent to their property that these
waters were now "unfit for any reasonable (recreational) use." '13 $20
million in compensatory damages and $100 million in punitive damages
were sought, along with equitable relief which would have required IPCo
to relocate its water intake system closer to the source of its waste dis-

charge system.

14

The case originated in Vermont's Addison County Superior Court,

but was removed to the United States District Court in Vermont on the
basis of diversity of citizenship. z

5

IPCo made a motion to have the case

dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction. It claimed that a court
sitting in an affected state could not hear a common law nuisance suit
involving the alleged pollution of interstate waters. Suits for enforcement
U.S. 186 (1972). The Supreme Court appointed a special Master to hear the matter. Brief for the
United States As Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, at 1, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (No. 85-1233).
On September 23, 1974, the parties reached an agreement and made a request for a consensual
motion to dismiss the complaint which the court subsequently granted. Notice of Motion to Dismiss,
at JA63, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (No. 85-1233). IPCo agreed to limit the phosphoric content of its
effluent discharges, and pay Vermont $500,000 for use in its water pollution control programs for
Lake Champlain. Agreement of Settlement Between the State of Vermont and International Paper
Co., at JA 93-JA95, International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (No. 85-1233).
International Paper Company later claimed that this agreement contained a covenant not to sue
which barred plaintiffs in Ouellette from pursuing their claims. Ouellette v. International Paper Co.,
602 F. Supp. 264 (1985), aff'd, 776 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 479 U.S. 481
(1987). This argument was rejected by the district court. It pointed out that the 1974 agreement
specifically preserved "any claims and rights of Vermont citizens and residents that may exist against
any party to the Supreme Court proceeding." 602 F.Supp. at 274.
Zahn v. International Paper Company, 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972) involved a class action by
200 riparian landowners and lessees who sought compensatory and punitive compensation for damages done to their property by a 300 acre sludge area which was allegedly caused by pollutants from
IPCo's plant. The class action suit was dismissed because the jurisdictional amount requirement was
deemed not to have been met.
213. Ouellette Complaint, at JA32, 602 F.Supp. 264 (D. Vermont 1985)(78-163), aff'd, 776
F.2d 55 (2d. Cir. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 479 U.S. 481 (1987):
Said wastes exceed the capacity of Lake Champlain to assimilate them and are detrimental to the lake and its fish and plant life ...Said discharges are foul, unhealthy, smelly
and aesthetically unpleasing and discolor the waters in, around and adjacent to Plaintiff's lakeshore properties, and the lakeshore properties of other members of the class,
make said waters turbid, and make them unfit for recreational use.
Id. The complaint contains two causes of action. The second relates to claims resulting from damages allegedly caused by discharges of smoke and fumes from IPCo's plant, and is not an issue here.
Id. at JA35.
214. Appellant's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at 2, International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479
U.S. 481 (1987) (No. 85-1233).
215. Brief of Petitioner, at 2, International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (No. 851233).
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could only be brought in the state in which the discharger was located.

IPCo also argued that the CWA preempted an affected state's laws.216
The District Court, whose decision was sustained in a two para2 17
graph per curiam opinion by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
denied the defendant's motion.2 1 8 In its opinion, the court acknowledged
that under Milwaukee I federal law was controlling. However, the "sav-

ing" clause of the Clean Water Act could be read to preserve traditional
tort law remedies such as the right to hold a person acting outside a

particular state liable according to the laws of that state for injurous con219
sequences within it.
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice
Powell, affirmed the lower court ruling that the Clean Water Act did not
bar the Vermont Court from hearing the case. However, it held that the
law of the source state would have to be applied.22 °

Justice Powell adopted many of the arguments made by Justice
Rehnquist in Milwaukee II. Preemption of state law (both statutory and
common) could be presumed when the federal legislation is "sufficiently
comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no

room for supplementary regulation.

' 22 1

According to Powell, this was

216. 602 F. Supp. at 266.
217. Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 776 F.2d 55 (1985). See also International Paper Company's Motion to Amend, at JA46, Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 602 F.Supp. 264 (D. Vermont 1985), (No. 78-163), aff'd, 776 F.2d 55 (1985), aff'd in part,rev'd in part,479 U.S. 481 (1987).
218. 776 F.2d at 274; see also 479 U.S. 481 (1987). IPCo argued that, when the federal government or an upstream state seeks to regulate discharges into interstate waters, they do so as sovereigns
attempting to balance two occasionally competing interests: namely, the maintenance of the integrity
of their streams against their commercial and economic interest in exploiting an essential resource.
Downstream states might lack such perspective since the industries causing the pollution are not
located within their boundaries. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at 6, International Paper Co. v.
Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (No. 85-1233). This "single-mindedness of approach" is likely to lead
to considerable bias, local prejudice, and the attitude that this "foreign" company is polluting "our"
waters. Id. The argument could be made, of course, that a judge or jury in an upstream state is likely
to be just as biased since it is the pollution of another state's waters which is the subject of the suit.
While it is likely that the upstream state's waters are also being polluted, it may very well be that the
downstream part of the river or lake is of greater value.
In its brief, IPCo pointed out that § 1365(c) of FWPCA requires that suits for enforcement under
the Act be brought in the judicial district in which the source is located. This shows that there is
nothing novel in a statutory scheme which accords the courts of one state the responsibility to exercise exclusive regulatory jurisdiction over pollution sources within its boundaries. Reply Brief of
Petitioner, at 5, International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (No. 85-1233). In fact,
plaintiff's suit in this case involved more than a demand for enforcement under the Act; and, therefore, § 1365(c) does not apply.
219. 602 F. Supp. 264 (1985), aff'd, 776 F.2d 55 (1985).
220. 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
221. Id. at 491.
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certainly the case with respect to the 1972 Amendments to the Clean
Water Act.
The Court maintained that the Clean Water Act did not contain
specific reference to the question of whether the law of an affected state
could be applied in interstate water pollution cases.2 22 Powell asserted
that the savings clause of the Citizen Suit provision only applies to that
part of the Act. He concluded that other sections of the Act might preclude state law. Further, the specific language of the state authority section limits its application to pollution stemming from within a state's
own borders.
In its opinion, the Court held that it is not necessary that a federal
statute provide explicitly that it preempts a specific state statute or common law remedy. It is enough, the Court held, to show that this statute
or common law conflicts with the goals or objectives which Congress
sought to achieve when it drafted the federal law.223 If the laws of an
affected state could be applied, argued Powell, the objectives which the
CWA sought to achieve would be thwarted.2 2 This is because in passing
the 1972 Amendments, Congress sought to do more than just eliminate
water pollution. It sought to create a regulatory system which would be
both efficient and predictable in the issuance and enforcement of discharge standards.2 25 The application of more than one state's nuisance
laws would lead to an irrational system of regulation in which industries
would be subject to vague and indeterminate standards.2 26 According to
the Court, great significance should be attached to the fact that the Act
fails to authorize downstream states to block the issuance of a permit
even when their own waters are affected.
In their two dissenting opinions, Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens took issue with the assumptions behind this argument. They pointed
out that there was no reason to believe that any difference existed between New York and Vermont law with regard to the class action suit
being filed against the International Paper Company.2 27 The Court
reached out to decide an issue which need never have become a point of
dispute between the parties. There was nothing in the record, the dissent222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. at 493.
Id. at 491 (quoting Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
Id at 493-94.
Id at 496.
Id.
479 U.S. 481 (Brennan, J., Marshall, J., Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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ers pointed out, to indicate whether Vermont choice of law rules would
look to the New York or Vermont law of nuisance in this case.
Justice Brennan returned to the theme articulated in the District
Court opinion that the CWA provided no support for deviating from
"well settled conflict of law principles" in tort cases. These principles
demand that in diversity cases a district court apply the conflict of law
rules of the state in which the court sits. When the purpose of a particular tort law is to ensure compensation of tort victims, an affected state's
nuisance law may be applied.22 8 According to Brennan, "[a] State's right
to apply its own tort law cannot be superseded unless there is clear evidence that Congress manifested such a purpose in drawing up a particular piece of federal legislation. No such proof exists in this case. In fact,
'2 29
the two 'saving clauses' indicate just the opposite.
The dissenters disputed the majority's suggestion that the elimination of water pollution was not to be regarded as the paramount goal of
the CWA. They described the need for a "rational" permitting system as
only a subsidiary goal. 230 Furthermore, there is no proof that allowing
an affected state's laws to be applied in an interstate water pollution case
would in any way conflict with this subsidiary objective. All a polluter
need do is comply with the most stringent standard set, whether it be
that of the source state or the affected state. Finally, the dissenters
pointed out that compliance with EPA discharge standards is not a defense to state tort suits. An affected state's nuisance law is not likely to be
any more vague or indefinite than a source state's nuisance law. 23'
IV. ARGUMENT: THE CLEAN WATER ACT Is
NOT ALL-ENCOMPASSING

A.

CongressionalIntent

In Milwaukee II and Ouellette the Court was unable to point to any
explicit language contained in either the 1972 legislation or the accompanying Senate and House Reports to support its assertion that the Congress had intended to preempt federal common law and the laws of
affected states.2 32 Indeed, the documentary evidence which does exist
228. Id.
229. Id. at 503. Indeed, the International Paper Company would come close to admitting this in
one of the briefs which they submitted to the Court. Reply Brief of Petitioner, at 8, International
Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (No. 85-1233).
230. 479 U.S. 481 at 504.
231. Id.
232. The Court implicitly acknowledges this in Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 491. ("Although courts
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points in exactly the opposite direction. In commenting upon the Citizen
Suit Provision, the Senate Committee on Public Works wrote that, "the
section would specifically preserve any rights or remedies under any
other law. Thus, if damages could be shown, other remedies would remain available. Compliance with requirements under this Act would not
'
This
be a defense to a common law action for pollution damages." 233
language seems to indicate that Congress intended the "savings clause"
to be applied to the whole act, and not just the specific section within
which it is contained.2 3 4 The House Committee on Public Works noted
in its report that it had, in most instances, rejected the federal government's suggestions in favor of preemption.2 3 5 State law was precluded
only where "the situation warranted it based upon the urgent need for
uniformity."2 6 In those few instances in which Congress actually intended to preempt, it specifically made known its wish.23 7
Both decisions are premised on the assumption that Congress had
intended to create an "all encompassing program of water pollution regulation" when they passed the 1972 Amendments.2 3 According to this
reasoning, the federal legislature had so completely occupied the field
that it could not possibly have meant to leave "room for courts to attempt to improve on that program through federal common law" 239 or
the laws of an affected state.' As proof of this Justice Rehnquist, in
Milwaukee II, and Justice Powell, in Ouellette, cited parts of the legislative history which they claimed showed that "congressional views on the
comprehensive nature of the legislation were practically universal." 24 1
A number of congressmen did, in fact, refer to the 1972 Amendments as being "comprehensive. "242 However, the word was only used in
a very limited way to indicate that the legislation contained many differshould not lightly infer pre-emption, it may be presumed when the federal legislation is sufficiently
comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress 'left no room' for supplementary
state regulation.") (quoting Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
233. FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1971: REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS, UNITED STATES SENATE TOGETHER WITH SUPPLEMENTARY

VIEWS TO ACCOMPANY S2770, cited in 2 LEG. HIST. OF CWA, supra note 42, at 1499 (1973).
234. See, eg., 479 U.S. at 504 (Brennan, J., Marshall, J., Blackmun, J., dissenting).
235. 1 LEG. HIsT. OF THE CWA, supra note 42, at 823.

236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 318-19 (1981); 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
239. 451 U.S. at 319.
240. 479 U.S. at 496.
241. Id. at 498; 451 U.S. at 318.
242. See, eg., 1LEG. HIST., supranote 42, at 343 (Rep. Young); id. at 350 (Rep. Blatnik); id., at
374 (Rep. Clausen); id, at 380 (Rep. Roberts); id., at 425 (Rep. Roe); id, at 450 (Rep. Reuss); id at

288
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ent strategies for regulating pollution.24 3 That the statute was never seen
as "all-encompassing" is evidenced by statements made by congressmen
and representatives of environmental groups concerning the need for a
citizen suit provision. 2' This section was explicitly modeled on the Citizen Suit Provision enacted in the Clean Air Amendments of 1970.245
Consequently, the legislative history of that statute has been used by
courts when construing the CWA's citizen suit provision.2 4 6
Legislators and environmentalists suspected that state and federal
administrative agencies would not always seek to enforce the laws vigorously, even if the resources needed to do this were at their disposal. 247
This could either result from bureaucratic ineptitude or susceptibility to
political pressures from the very industries they were supposed to be reg467 (Rep. Dingell); id., at 481 (Rep. Caffery); id., at 1302 (Sen. Cooper); id., at 1408. (Sen. Hart)
(cited in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981)).
243. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
244. See infra notes 245-278 and accompanying text.
245. S. REp. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1971); U.S. CODE CONG. ADMIN. NEws 3745
(1972), reprintedin 2 LEG. HisT. OF CWA, supra note 42 at 1497.
246. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
247. See, eg., S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-39 (1970), reprinted in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE

CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970 at 436 [herinafter A LEG. HIST. OF THE C.A.A]; House Oversight Hearings,supra note 92, at 865, 866 (statement of Carl Pope, Zero Population Growth):
Our failure, after so many years, to seriously abate water pollution may be seen as the
combined function of such nonenforcement and of the associated failure to fully involve
In some cases where the failure to enforce is
the public in solving the problem ....
deliberate, or where information or resources needed to bring a certain case are accessible only to Government, a direct suit against the Administrator may be appropriate.
Water Pollution Control Legislation,Pt 2: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 103 (1971) (remarks of Mr.
Rill, Attorney at Law, Collier, Shannon, Rill & Edwards, representing the American Iron and Steel
Institute):
[Tmhe charge does inevitably arise that the administrative agencies are sometimes guilty
I am afraid that too often
of laxity, lassitude and less than efficient enforcement ....
As a consequence, I think
there has been a kernal of merit behind [these] charges ....
there is some room as a safeguard . .. for private actions to be authorized by this
legislation.
Id. See also statement of Senator Hruska, whose remarks in opposition lend support to this paper's
thesis:
The proposal is predicated on the erroneous assumption that officials of the Executive
Branch of the United States Government will not perform and carry out their responsibilities and duties under the Clean Air Act. Never before in the history of the United
States has the Congress proceeded on the assumption that the Executive Branch will not
carry out the Congressional mandate, hence, private citizens shall be given specific statutory authority to compel such officials to do so.
Id See SENATE CONSIDERATION OF THE REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE (December

18, 1970), reprinted in 1 LEG. Hisr. OF THE CAA, supra note 247, at 127.
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ulating. 1 8 It was felt that officials who were aware that they could be
hauled into court for failing to administer the law properly would be
more apt to take action against polluters, and less likely to ignore the

concerns of those adversely affected by pollution.2 49 Consequently, it was
imperative that the public be involved in the enforcement process. The
Senate Committee on Public Works concluded in its report that "Government initiative in seeking enforcement under the Clean Air Act has
been restrained. Authorizing citizens to bring suits for violation of standards should motivate governmental agencies charged with the responsibility to bring enforcement and abatement proceedings."'25 0 Similar
sentiments were expressed during hearings over the Clean Water Act.

Mr. James Rill's remarks were typical:
[T]he charge does inevitably arise that the administrative agencies are
sometimes guilty of laxity, lassitude and less than efficient enforcement... I
am afraid that too often there has been merit behind [t]hese charges ....As
a consequence I think there is some room as a safeguard ...for private
actions to be authorized by this legislation. 2 5'

It was generally felt that, even assuming the best of intentions on the
part of those who ran the pollution programs, it would be virtually im248. See, eg., S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-39, (1970), reprintedin 1 LEG. HIST. OF
CAA, supra note 247, at 436. Congress seemed to have been influenced by the theories of bureaucratic regulation, espoused by scholars at that time, which saw enforcement agencies as being unduly
sympathetic to the industries they were supposed to be overseeing. See Boyer & Meidinger, Privatizing RegulatoryEnforcement:A PreliminaryAssessment of Citizen Suits Under FederalEnvironmental
Laws, 34 BuFFALO L. REv. 833, 843.44 (1985). See also R. SHERRILL, supra note 69, at 173-82
(showing that instances of bureaucratic corruption were quite common at that time.).
249. See House OversightHearings,supranote 92, at 854, 858 for a statement of Miss Barbara J.
Reid, Legislative Director, Environmental Action Inc., Washington, D.C.:
Unfortunately, lack of enforcement of laws has long been prevalent in water pollution
regulation. Government resources are always limited and often, knowing that citizens
cannot readily intervene, government simply does not enforce the law or enforces it halfheartedly. A viable citizen suit provision is necessary to make sure pollution control
legislation is enforced and therefore effectively.
Id. See Reopened House Hearings,supra note 88, at 454 for remarks of Mr. Sax:
When the job of law enforcement is left solely to regulatory agencies, government tends
to move away from that grass roots involvement with the people of the community....
The more remote those agencies are, as in Washington, the greater the risks of unresponsiveness to the needs of the people. Recognition of the right of members of the community to be a part of the legal process that affects them is the surest guarantee that
ultimately government will not lose its ties to its own people.

Id.
250. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1970), reprinted in LEG. HisT. OF CAA,
supra note 247, at 436-37.
251. Water Pollution ControlLegislation, Pt. 1, Hearingson S.573, Before the Subcomm. on Air
and Water Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 103 (1971)
(remarks of Mr. Rill).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

possible for the government to detect and monitor all of the violations
which were likely to occur under the Act.2 52 Furthermore, it would be
prohibitively expensive to take court action against all dischargers who
failed to comply with the law.25 3 Ramsey Clark, who had served as Attorney General during the Johnson Administration, stated in testimony
before the Senate Subcommittee on Energy, Natural Resources and the

Environment that:
[i]t
will be impossible for government enforcement to control all significant acts of pollution... If we are really serious about controlling the quality of our environment before it destroys the quality of our fives, we must
give the individual affected by, or concerned about pollution in his life, the
power to stop them through legal process.2 54
These views were echoed by Senator Gary Hart: "The basic argu-

ment for the [citizen suit] provision is plain: namely, the government
simply is not equipped to take court action against the numerous viola' Similarly,
tions of legislation of this type which are likely to occur."255
Senator Muskie stated that:
[I]t is too much too presume that, however.., well intentioned these enforcement agencies, they will be able to monitor the potential violations of
the requirements contained in all the implementation plans that will be filed
252. See LEG. HisT. OF THE C.A.A., supra note 247, at 278 for remarks of Senator Hruska:
[Tihe agency might not be at fault if it does not act promptly or does not enforce the act
as comprehensively and as thoroughly as it would like to do. Some of its capablilities
depend on the wisdom of the appropriations process of this Congress. It would not be
the first time that a regulatory act would not have been provided with sufficient funds
and manpower to get the job done.
Id See Reopened Hearings,supra note 88, at 438-39 for remarks of Mr. Zwick, representative of the
Nader Water Pollution Project:
I think the real reason citizen suits are needed is the fact the Government often has not
and predictably will not be able to enforce the law. Oftentimes, it is a question of resources, the survey that we took in the course of our study in various regions of EPA
indicated that none of them had even, after the tremendous budget increase in this particular year's budget, any greater than a third of the number of persons working on
enforcement they believed was minimally necessary to carry out their existing authority
in the enforcement provisions of the law.
Id.; See id. at 454 for remarks of Mr. Sax:
The background of citizen suit legislation is a simple but dramatic fact. Every regulatory
and law enforcement agency that I am aware of operates with less staff and less funds
than it needs to do the job with which it has been entrusted.... It will probably never be
possible for legislatures, with all the pressing competing demands for the taxpayer's dollar, to remedy this problem with public appropriations.
Id
253. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
254. 1 LEG. HiST. OF CAA, supra note 247, at 355.
255. Id. at 355-57.

1988/89)

INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION

under this Act, all the other requirements of this Act, and the responses of
the enforcement officers. Citizens can be a useful instrument for detecting
violations, and bringing them to the attention of the enforcement agencies
and the courts alike.2S5

Several questions must now be asked: If Congress was so anxious to
gain the public's help in enforcing pollution laws, why would it wish to
make it more difficult for an injured party to sue a polluter by either
preempting federal common law or an affected state's laws? Was it really
Congress's intention to make those parties directly affected by pollution
totally dependent on laws which might very well prove to be impossible
to enforce adequately? Before passage of the 1972 Amendments, plaintiffs in interstate water pollution cases were not forced to rely on the
source state's laws. Why would legislators, operating at a time when the
public was strongly supportive of tougher action against polluters, want
to make those who had been directly injured by pollution worse off than
before the bill had been passed? In 1977, the state of Illinois won a nuisance suit against the city of Milwaukee based on federal common law.2 57
Milwaukee was ordered to eliminate all sewage overflows. Ultimately,
the city was not forced to do this because it was in compliance with a
permit issued pursuant to a law which was deemed by the Court to have
preempted the federal common law of nuisance. The foregoing analysis
demonstrates that this is not the result which Congress intended when it
passed the Act. Legislators did not believe that they were creating a
shield which would protect polluters from the consequences of their actions. A mere reading of the "Congressional declaration of goals and policy" contained in Title I should make this clear.2 58 Among the objectives
listed are the elimination of discharges of pollutants into navigable waters by 1985, the attainment of an interim goal of water quality which
would provide for the protection and propagation of fish and wildlife,
and the prohibition of the discharge of pollutants in toxic amounts.2 59 In
pursuit of these aims, Section 101 calls for the development of more advanced pollution technology, 2 1 as well as the construction of federally
financed waste treatment works. 26 1 The requirements of industry and
municipalities are not addressed at all in this section. There is absolutely
no mention anywhere in the Act of the need to ensure that industrial or
256. Id. at 280.
257. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 155 (7th Cir. 1979).
258. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982).
259. Id.
260. Id. § 1251(a)(6).
261. Id. § 1251(a)(5).
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municipal dischargers are not "overburdened" as a result
of being subject
26 2
to the laws of several different sources of authority.
Contrary to what Justice Powell seems to have implied in Ouellette,
Congress did not value administrative efficiency and uniformity more
highly than the elimination of pollution. At the time the 1972 Amendments were passed, there was a genuine sense of urgency in the country
concerning the need to combat water pollution. 26 3 Legislators were not
immune from the feeling that the nation faced great peril if it did not take
dramatic action to arrest the deterioration of the nation's rivers, streams
and lakes. Congresswoman Bella Abzug and Congressman Charles Rangel articulated these fears in a written statement which was entered into
the Congressional Record:
Our Nation's waters-our most precious natural resource-are rapidly
being transformed into a vast, rancid sewer. Scarcely an uncontaminated
body of water remains in the United States. A constant torrent of waste,
mostly untreated, pours into our waterways from farms, factories, and cities. And
despite Administration claims of progress the situation is getting
26 4
worse.

The Ouellette Court cited one part of a Senate Report which stated
'265
that the CWA sought to achieve "clear and identifiable requirements.
This part of the Court's decision is revealing for two reasons. First, instead of quoting the congressional document directly, it chose, instead, to
paraphrase what had been written. In the opinion, the word "standards"
was substituted for the word "requirements. ' 266 This is not insignificant
because the meaning of the word "requirement" is much more limited,
and carries ' 26with it far less of a preemptive connotation than the word
"standard. 7 More importantly, the Court took the Report's words
262. Clean Water Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982). Major new
amendments to this legislation were enacted on February 4, 1987. See Water Quality Act of 1987, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1987).
263. See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
264. 1 LEG. HisT. OF CWA, supra note 42, at 862. See supra notes 94, 95, 106 and accompanying text.
265. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 496 n.16 (1987), construing S. REP. No.

414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEG. HIST. OF CWA, supra note 42, at 1499
(emphasis added).
266. S.REP.No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1971), reprintedin 2 LEG. HIST. OF CWA, supra

note 42, at 1499.
267. The word "standard" is defined as "that which is... established by authority... as that
which is proper and adequate for a given purpose." WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY,
2455 (2d ed. 1952). It may also be used to mean "criterion." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE

DICTIONARY 1148 (1986). "Requirement" is merely something "essential to the existence or occurrence of something else." Id at 1002.

1988/89]

INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION

293

out of context. The decision stressed that the application of an affected
state's laws would make it impossible for a manufacturer or municipality
to predict what the proper standard was for lawful discharges, thereby,
undermining the "methods by which the... [CWA] was designed to
reach [its] goal."' 268 But the report spoke of the need to achieve "clear
and identifiable requirements" so that there would be "manageable and
precise benchmarks for enforcement. '26 9 The entire section of the report
which the Court paraphrased was concerned with the problem of ensuring that dischargers complied with the law.2 7 It was the part of the report which analyzed the citizen suits of Section 505.71 Contrary to the
Court's interpretation, the objective of the "clear and identifiable requirements" was not to make it easier for polluters to determine the degree to
which they might be held liable in the future, but to remedy defects in
previous federal efforts to control polution.27 2 This becomes more evident from the remarks made by Senator Muskie during Congressional
debate over the 1972 Amendments.2 73 He stated that the three essential
elements needed to ensure the success of the bill were "[u]niformity, finality and enforcebility. ' ' 274 According to Mr. Muskie, "uniformity and
finality" merely refer to the need to ensure that polluters are not granted
extensions for meeting "best practicable" technology deadlines, and that
all discharges, whether they be intermittent or continuous, are subject to
the bill's provisions.2 75
268. 479 U.S. at 494.
269. S.REP. No.414, 92d Cong. IstSess. 81 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEG. HMsT. OF CWA, supra

note 42, at 1499 (emphasis added).
270. Id. at 1497-1500.
271. Id. at 1497.
272. See, e-g., iL at 1256-57.

273. 1 LEG. HIsT.oF CWA, supra note 42, at 162.
274. Id.

275. Id. at 163.
As far as uniformity and finality are concerned, the conference agreement provided that
each polluter within a category or class of industrial sources will be required to achieve
nationally uniform effluent limitations based on "best practicable" technology no later
than July 1, 1977. This does not mean that the Administrator cannot require compliance

by an earlier date; it means that these limitations must be uniform, and that they will be
final upon the issuance of a permit under section 402 of the bill ...
The Administrator's authority is not limited to those cases in which there is a continuing violation. Any discharge, intermittent or continuous, which the Administrator finds
violates the terms of the permit, is to be enforced. The conferees expect that the Admin-

istrator will act as aggressively against those violations which only intermittently occur
as he will act against those violations which occur on a continuous basis.

Id at 162-63. Section 1253(a) of the Clean Water Act states that the Administrator should "encourage" uniform state laws, but only so far as "practicable". 33 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1982).
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The basic aim of the CWA is to impose increasingly more stringent
27 6
national emission standards through a "technology forcing" strategy.
For this reason, that the Act calls for "a major research... effort... to
develop technology necessary to eliminate the discharge of pollutants
into navigable waters. 277 It is difficult to fathom how the Court's ruling
in Milwaukee II and Ouellette is consistent with the achievement of this
goal. It is generally acknowledged that the threat of having to pay damages can often serve as an effective spur to induce industry and governmental agencies to develop new technologies to minimize nuisance.278
B.

The Clean Water Act As Is

Neither Justice Rehnquist, in Milwaukee II, nor Justice Powell, in
Ouellette, discussed how the Act was actually being administered and
enforced on a day-to-day basis. After explaining that the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System was designed to regulate every point
source, they failed to follow up with the next obvious question: Was the
System, in fact, doing this? The answer is that it was not. A random
survey of major dischargers in six states conducted by the General Accounting Office (GAO) showed that "[non-compliance] with permit limits was widespread, frequent and significant."2'7 9 Eighty-two percent had

violated the terms of their permits at least once during an eighteen month
period, and, of these, one out of every three had exceeded their limits by
as much as fifty percent.280 Furthermore, thousands of businesses which
released pollutants into the waters were found either not to have been
issued permits, or held permits that had expired.281 Other government
reports support this finding. Eight years ago the House Subcommittee on
Oversight and Review declared that the National Pollutant
Discharge
'28 2
Elimination System was "on the verge of collapse.
The EPA relies on self-monitoring by dischargers to detect and re276. R. STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 515 (1978).
277. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(6) (1982).
278. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 226, 257 N.E.2d 870, 873, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312, 317 (1970).
279. G.A.O. REPORT B-200800, WASTEWATER DISCHARGERS ARE NOT COMPLYING WITH
E.P.A. POLLUTION CONTROL PERMITS RCED 84-53 1 (1983) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
280. Id. There were two reasons for this: EPA and the various states had not processed permit
applications in a timely fashion, and none of the six states surveyed had developed independent
methods for detecting noncompliance.
281. Id. at 30.
282. Implementation of the Federal Water PollutionControlAct, REPORT BY THE Housn SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REviEw, COMMITrEE ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION 1, (96-71), (December 1980), as cited in M. WARD, supra note 19, at 42.
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port noncompliance.2 8 3 Much of the information submitted has been
found to be either incomplete or inaccurate,2 84 thereby making it impossible to determine the precise scope and magnitude of the violations
which are occurring.185 This is particularly true in states such as New
York, which do not even require that minor industrial dischargers sub28 6
mit reports.
When Congress originally formulated the waste water treatment
program, found in Title II, it vastly underestimated the problems that
arose in meeting the goals of the Act. 28 7 Thirty-five percent of the nation's major municipal dischargers have been unable to complete the construction necessary to fulfill the Act's statutory requirements.2 88
Untreated sewage continues to flow into such major waterways as Boston
Harbor, the Hudson River and Lake Michigan. 2 9 Efforts to induce the
responsible municipalities to comply with the law is hindered by the fact
that both state and federal enforcement agencies will generally not prosecute localities which have applied for federal funds to upgrade existing
facilities.29 °
The EPA has not been able to comply with the deadlines for publishing effluent guidelines, as mandated in Title 111.291 In 1975, the EPA
entered into a consent decree with a national environmental organization, whereby it agreed to publish final effluent guidelines by December
of 1979.292 This deadline proved too ambitious, and it was extended several times for a number of pollutants.2 9 3 After examining the manner in
which the CWA had been administered, the Subcommittee on Oversight
and Review, in the very same year in which Milwaukee /1 was decided,
expressed grave doubt as to whether the EPA was capable of putting into
effect a "genuinely workable, legally defensible and cost-effective regulatory scheme with which industry and local government [could] reason283.

GAO REPORT, supra note 279, at 16-19.

284. Id.
285. 11 at 23.
286. Id.
287. EPA has estimated that it will cost as much as 109 billion dollars to fully implement the
construction grant program.
288. Id at 2.
289. Id at 25. See also Doneski, Cleaning Up Boston Harbor:Fact or Fiction?, 12 B.C. ENV'T.
AF. L. REv. 559 (1985); Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 308-9 (1981).
290. GAO REPORT, supra note 279, at 3.
291. See, eg., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
292. Id See also M. WARD, supra note 19, at 31.
293. M. WARD, supra note 19, at 32.

296

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

ably be expected to comply.

'294

[Vol. 37

The situation has not changed

dramatically since then. In the 1977 and 1987 Amendments, 295 Congress
found it necessary to extend the deadlines for all classes of point sources

because EPA had not yet finished formulating all of the necessary
standards.2 9 6

Officials of the EPA and state environmental agencies are often
forced to rely on their "best professional judgment" when setting permit
limits in instances in which there are no effective effluent guidelines.2 97
One private study has found that this entails a great deal of administrative latitude which is "often tilted in the direction of leniency. "298 Discre-

tion is built into the system in other ways as well. Federal enforcement
officials may issue variances, whereby individual plants will not have to
meet federal standards, if the facility can demonstrate that it is subject to
"fundamentally different factors" than those taken into account when
the standards were originally promulgated. 2 99 Officials may also modify
the requirements which have to be met by individual businesses if such

modifications will "represent the maximum use of technology within the
economic capability of the owner.., and... will result in reasonable
further progress toward the elimination of the discharge of pollutants."'3 "° Furthermore, EPA has taken the position that it does not have
to issue a compliance order every time it determines that a violation has
occurred.3" 1 This distressing amount of latitude has led to uneven and
inconsistent enforcement of the law.3 "2 Historically, case referrals from
EPA to the Justice Department have fluctuated according to the political
294. Implementation of the Federal Water Pollution ControlAct, REPORT BY THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW, COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTA-

"nON1, (96-71), (December 1980), as cited in M. WARD, supra note 19, at 32.
295. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1987).
296. The 1977 Act established three categories of effluent limitations, with deadlines ranging
from July 1, 1983 to July 1, 1987. In the 1987 Amendments, the deadline for priority toxic pollu-

tants, conventional pollutants and non-conventional pollutants was extended to July 31, 1990. M.
HOUGHTAN, supra note 63, at 12.

297. Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 248, at 886. When using "best professional judgment",
officials rely on a "combination of limited knowledge of water quality and engineering common
sense." Id.
298. Id
299. EPA's authority to utilize the "fundamentally different factor" approach was upheld in
Chemical Mfrs' Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985). The 1987
Amendments to the Clean Water Act explicitly granted EPA the right to do this, but attempted to
impose limits on the instances where it may be used.
300. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c) (1982).
301. See, eg., Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485, 489 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Andreen, supra
note 46, at 242.
302. See generally Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 248, at 871, 907-17.
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orientation of the Administration in power.3 °3
The problems associated with enforcing the Clean Water Act are by
no means limited to the defects presently existing in the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. Under the Act, major sources of pollution go unregulated. More than one half of the nation's population
depends upon ground water for its daily drinking supply; yet, the federal
government has not developed a coherent policy for regulating pollution
of this important resource. 3° When state officials were asked by EPA to
rank the sources of pollution affecting lakes and estuaries which are not
able to support the uses to which they have traditionally been put,
nonpoint sources (i.e., runoff from mining cites, city streets, farm land
and other diffuse soures) 305 were reported as the leading cause of failure. 3 6 Unfortunately, there is also no regulatory program currently in
existence, 7which is binding upon the states, that addresses this
30
problem.
Even if all that is sought is injunctive relief, the Citizen Suit Provision still contains several drawbacks from a plaintiff's point of view. It is
incapable of acting as an antidote for the many defects which exist in the
administration and enforcement of the law, and can in no way be considered an acceptable alternative to the remedies which have traditionally
been available to plaintiffs in interstate water pollution cases.
The Act specifies that a suit can only be brought against the Administrator if he has failed to carry out an act or duty "which is not discretionary. ' 308 In a complex statute like the CWA, it is not always clear
what is and what is not a "discretionary" duty. For example, at least one
federal circuit court has accepted the position, advocated by EPA, that
the agency is not required to issue a compliance order in every case
where it has been determined that a violation has occurred.30 9
303. Id. at 870-71. ("Case referrals from the E.P.A. to the Department of Justice for prosecution dropped dramatically [during the first four years of the Reagon Administration] from the baseline of the Carter Administration.")
304. See generallyIngram & Mann, Preservingthe Clean Water Act: The AppearanceofEnvironmental Victory, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1980s 251-71 (1984).
305. 133 CONG. REc. S748 (1987).
306.

E.P.A., NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY:

1984 REPORT TO CONGRESS 20

(1984).
307. Water Quality Act of 1987, § 319(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (1987). See also 133 CONG. REC.
S1698 (1987) (remarks of Mr. Mitchell); 133 CONG. REc. S1694 (1987) (remarks of Mr. Symms).
For a misrepresentation of the non-point program see President's Veto Message ofHR. 1, as cited in
133 CONG. REc. S1691-92 (1987) (President Reagan states that H.R. 1 is a Federal land management program in which the government will be able to tell farmers how to plow their fields.)
308. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (1982).
309. Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485, 489-90 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Anderson, supra note
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Citizen suits are barred "if the Administrator or State has com-

menced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court
of the United States or State." 31 0 Again, the definition of "due diligence"
is not clear. In many instances it will be years before a case reaches final
disposition. How many telephone calls must the relevant agency official
make before he may be considered to be pursuing the case in a "diligent"

manner? How many formal administrative hearings must he held? How
much time is to be allowed for settlement talks before it is demanded that
the case be prosecuted in court? The Act provides no clear answer to
these questions.3 1 1 The Third Circuit has gone so far as to hold that,

under certain circumstances, the term "court" may include agency administrative proceedings, even if the case is not in a state or federal court
of law.312
The government is permitted to seek penalties, under Section

309(d), for both past and ongoing violations of effluent standards or permit conditions.3 1 3 The Fifth Circuit has held that the citizen suit provi-

sion can only be applied prospectively, and that private citizens may not
3 14
seek to impose penalties for illegal actions which occurred previously.

The primary weakness of citizen suits is that they can only be
brought to enforce the "provisions of the act or the requirements that are
established as a result of the operations of the act. '315 If a pollutant is not
covered under the Act or if standards have been set by EPA which are

insufficiently rigorous, no cause of action exists.31 6 This is not an uncom51, at 240-41. But see South Carolina Wildlife Federation v. Alexander, 457 F.Supp. 118, 130
(D.S.C. 1978). ("Statutory language that an act 'shall' be carried out is generally regarded as
mandatory.").
310. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1982).
311. See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 248, at 850.
312. Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 217 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 441 U.S,
961 (1979)("[F]or a state administrative board to be a "court"... that tribunal must be empowered
to grant relief which will provide meaningful and effective enforcement of an implementation plan."
Id.); see also, Note, Citizen Suits Under the Clean Water Act, 38 RUTGERS L. REv. 813, 831-33
(1986).
313. Clean Water Act § 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1982); see United States v. Earth Sciences,
Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 376 (10th Cir. 1979).
314. Haniker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co., 756 F.2d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 1985).
315. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
316. There is some logic behind this since the aim of the section is not to make an injured
individual whole (as is the case in actions for damages) but to see to it that the law is adequately
enforced. It should be noted that another reason why the citizen suit provision is deficient from the
perspective of the plaintiff is because it does not authorize class actions. S. REP. No. 914, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 81, reprintedin 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3668, 3746-3747 (1972); see also
City of Evansville, Inc. v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, 604 F.2d 1008, 1014 (7th Cir. 1979), cerl
denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980).
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mon occurrence.

3 17

The Ouellette Court justified its decision by stressing the importance
of not undermining "the... goals of efficiency and predictability in the
permit system. ''31 Even if we subscribe to the Court's interpretation of
these objectives,3 19 the argument fails for two reasons. As the dissenters
in the case pointed out, the majority failed to provide any empirical evidence to show that the application of an affected state's laws would undermine a regulatory system which was operating in a truly efficient and
predictable way. 320 A discharger would merely have to comply with the
laws of the state with the most stringent standards in order to ensure that
it was in compliance with the laws of all of the states bordering a given
waterway. 32 However, even if such empirical proof could be found, it is
extremely difficult to understand what possible significance it could have,
if at the time the opinion was rendered, it was readily apparent that the
system was functioning in an inefficient and unpredictable manner.
V. EPA's ABILITY To ASSUME PERMITTING AUTHORITY
PURSUANT To SECTION 1342(D) HAS NOT, IN PRACTICE,
PROVIDED AFFECTED DOWNSTREAM STATES

WITH EFFECTIVE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

In his opinion in Ouellette, Justice Powell pointed out that the CWA
does establish a procedure whereby an affected state may demand the
3 22
right to be consulted before a source state issues an NDPDES permit.
Mr. Powell also noted that, if the source state issues the permit over the
downstream state's objections, the affected state has the right to appeal to
the CWA Administrator. Once an appeal is lodged, the Administrator
then has authority to disapprove the permit.3 23 The Act, as amended in
1977, also grants the Administrator permitting authority in the event of
an impasse between the source state and EPA 32 4 The intent of Congress
in granting EPA this power appears to have been to provide affected
states with prompt injunctive relief.325 Unfortunately, the experience of
317.

M. WARD, supra note 19, at 5.

318.

479 U.S. 496 (1987).

319. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
320. 479 U.S. at 504-05 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
Blackmun, J., Marshall, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part).
321. Id. at 506.
322. Int'l. Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
323. Id.

324. § 402(D)(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(4).
325.

During the Senate Debates over the 1977 Amendments to the CWA, Senator Muskie, the
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Tennessee in its dispute with North Carolina over Champion International's pollution of the Pigeon River would seem to indicate that such
relief will not be forthcoming in situations where a source state or an
industrial pollutor is able to muster substantial political support for the
pollutor's activities. 2 6 The CWA can in no way be considered a satisfactory alternative to the equitable remedies previously available to downstream plaintiffs under federal common law and the laws of the affected
state.
The Champion Mill, built in 1907 in Canton, North Carolina, just
26 miles northwest of Tennessee produces approximately 1,500 tons of
pulp and 1,600 tons of food and paper board each day.32 7 Its intake pipe
draws 46.4 million gallons of water from the river on a daily basis.328
This water flows through a primary and secondary waste water treatment plant, where it is turned brown by lignin and tannin, two natural
components in wood used in the mill's bleaching process. 2 9 It is then
floor manager of the bill, stated that "It is intended, that this process, § 402(D)(4), be utilized to
insure the rapid issuance of an effective, valid permit." Senate Debate (Dec. 15, 1977), cited in
Champion Int'l. Corp. v. EPA, 850 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1988). The Senate Report accompanying this
legislation provided the following explanation for the legislation adopted:
EPA has been much too hesitant to take any actions where States have approved permit
programs. The result might well be the creation of "pollution havens" in some of those
States which have approved permit programs. This result is exactly what the 1972
amendments were designed to avoid. Lack of a strong EPA oversight of State programs
is neither fair to industry nor to States that are vigorously pursuing the Act's requirements. The committee is concerned that the Agency is not conducting a vigorous overview of State programs to assure uniformity and consistency of permit requirements and
of the enforcement of violations of permit conditions.
S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 73, reprintedin 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs
4326, 4398, cited in Champion Int'l. Corp. v. EPA, 850 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1988). The Conference
Report went further with regard to this point:
There have been occassions under the existing law where the Administrator has objected
to the issuance of a State permit, the State has refused to issue a revised permit, and in
the absence of effluent limiations for a source specified in a permit, the Administrator
has initiated enforcement action against the source seeking particular effluent reductions.
This may also have occurred in other cases where a valid permit is not in effect. After the
date of enactment of this provision the Administrator is expected is use the authority
given by this amendment to issue a permit after objecting to a State-issued permit. Thus
any litigation over the degree of effluent reduction required for a source should take
place in the context of judicial review of the permit, rather than in the context of an
enforcement action.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 830, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 73, reprintedin 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 4424, 4472, cited in Champion Int'l. Corp. v. EPA, 850 F.2d at 182.
326. See supra notes 1-28 and accompanying text for background information on this dispute.
327. The Mountaineer, May 8, 1987, at IA, col. 1.
328. Id. See also The Mountaineer, April 22, 1987, at 1A, col. 4.
329. The Mountaineer, May 8, 1987, at IA, col 1; The Mountaineer, April 22, 1987, at Al, col.
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returned to the river."3 ' Unfortunately, the Pigeon River's average
stream flow is only 48 million gallons per day.33 1 Thus, the mill diverts
virtually the entire flow of the river, especially during periods of dry
weather. The Pigeon is simply not capable of handling the discharge
from Champion's facilities. The river remains dark and murky along
much of its journey through Tennessee.3 32 Oliver Blackwell, director of
operations at the mill, has stated that no one would choose to build a
plant on the river today.3 33
Until 1981, Champion operated its plant under an NPDES permit
issued by the State of North Carolina, which did not attempt to regulate
color.33 4 In that year the permit expired, but no action was taken by the
state to renew it. 335 The company continued its activities, however, under
the guidelines of the old permit.33 6
In 1983, the State of Tennessee and a local Tennessean citizens' activist organization, the Pigeon River Action Group (PRAG), began to
lobby North Carolina to issue a new, more stringent permit which would
prevent Champion from violating Tennessee's water quality standards.3 37
While purely aesthetic and environmental concerns were certainly motivating factors, economic considerations also played a critical role. Business and civic leaders in a number of communities in Tennessee felt that
Champion's pollution of the river was undermining their attempts to attract tourists.3 38
Tennessee developed a draft permit for Champion which, in May of
1983, it formerly requested that North Carolina adopt. 339 Under this
proposed permit, discoloration below the mill would have been limited to
330. Actually only 45 million gallons of water are poured back into it. Champion Int'l. Corp. v.
EPA, 850 F.2d 182, 184 (4th Cir. 1988).
331. Champion Int'l. Corp. v. EPA, 850 F.2d at 183; The Mountaineer, April 22, 1981, at 8A.
The Pigeon River rises 20 miles south of Canton, North Carolina. It flows northwest into Tennessee.
Approximately 80 miles from its source, it empties into the French Broad River, just east of T.V.A.'s
Douglas Lake. The Sunday Tennessean, June 28, 1987, at 4-H.
332. The Ashville Citizen, May 9, 1987, at 1; N.Y. Times, January 3, 1988, at A20, col. 3; the
Dead River Pigeon Council Resolution, December 31, 1986.
333. The Mountaineer, February 27, 1987, at IA; The Knoxville Journal, January 2, 1988, at 1.
334. Champion Int'l. Corp. v. EPA, 648 F.Supp. 1390, 1392 (W.D.N.C. 1986), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, Champion Int'l. Corp. v. EPA, 850 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1982).
335. Id.
336. Champion Int'l. Corp. v. EPA, 850 F.2d 182, 183 (4th Cir. 1988).
337. Champion Int'l. Corp. v. EPA, 648 F.Supp. at 1392. Tennessee had developed a model
permit for the mill which proposed a limit on stream color at the state lineld.
338. The Ashville Citizen, May 9, 1987, at 1. The land along the Pigeon River is made up of
largely scenic wooded and recreational areas. Champion Int'l. Corp. v. EPA, 850 F.2d at 1.
339. Champion Int'l. Corp. v. EPA, 648 F.Supp. at 1392.
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50 color units. 3 ' The effluent discharged by the mill averages 700-900
color units annually, with measurements in excess of 1,300 units when
the river is low. 34 1 When it became obvious that North Carolinan officials
had no intention of adopting the proposed limitations, Tennessee requested EPA assistance in resolving the dispute. 342 During the following year, EPA officials analyzed the problem of pollution in the Pigeon
River and essentially endorsed the color unit limitations of Tennessee's
draft permit.34 3 On October 26, 1984, North Carolina issued a draft permit which did not include the limitations endorsed by EPA3 1 In response, a public hearing was held at which officials of Tennessee were
given an opportunity to voice their objections to the permit. 34 5 On May
14, 1985, North Carolina issued a final permit.34 6 Three months later
EPA objected to it on the grounds that it "did not assure compliance
with water quality color standards under 33 U.S.C. Section
131 1(b)(1)(C), and did not.., insure a 50 color count standard 26 miles
downstream. '34 7 On November 13th, EPA assumed permitting author340. Id.
341. The Mountaineer, April 22, 1987, at IA; The Mountaineer, May 8, 1987, at IA, 9A.
342. Champion Int'l. Corp. v. EPA, 648 F.Supp. at 1392. Tennessean officials also commenced
a civil action against Champion pursuant to Tennessean statutes and common law which was dismissed on the basis of the preventive scope of the CWA. See notes 1-27 and accompanying text.
343. Champion Int'l. Corp. v. EPA, 648 F.Supp. at 1392. EPA recommended that an in-stream
50 color unit stream limitation be reflected in the permit. Id.
344. Id.
345. Shortly after the hearing, North Carolina modified its water quality standard to include an
aesthetic critereon for the first time. Champion Int'l. Corp. v. EPA, 648 F. Supp. at 1393. However,
the draft permit was not amended to include this new criteria despite C.P.A.'s request that this be
done. Id. at 1394.
346. Champion Int'l. Corp. v. EPA, 850 F.2d at 184.
347. Id. The reasons given by E.P.A. for objecting to the North Carolina permit were the
following:
The permit did not assure compliance with the North Carolina water quality standards
in that it provides no basis for how North Carolina interprets, applies or enforces its
narrative color standards (aesthetic quality);
The permit did not require Champion to unequivocally comply with either Tennessee's
or North Carolina's standard. If the ultrafiltration demonstration project is unsuccessful
[Champion was experimenting with this system of color removal], the permit does not
require any further color removal and only provides that additional color removal
"may" be required;
The permit did not assure compliance with the Tennessee color standard since it does
not assure the 50 color unit in-stream limit at the state line will be met when influent
values exceed 800 color units at low flows. EPA also noted that it had found North
Carolina's reasons for rejecting Tennessee's recommendations to be inadequate pursuant
to 40 C.F.R. § 123.44(c)(2), thereby invoking an objection under § 402(d)(2)(a).
Champion Int'l. Corp. v. EPA, 648 F.Supp. 1390 (W.D.N.C. 1986).
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ity,348 and, in April of 1987, actually issued the final version of its own

draft permit which included the 50 unit color standard to be measured
one half mile below the plant.34 9 It would not be until June 24, 1988, five
years after the State of Tennessee and its citizens had begun their fight
against Champion, that the Fourth Circuit, over a challenge by Champion, would uphold EPA's right to issue its permit.35 ° Notwithstanding
the issuance of the permit, Champion continues to operate pursuant to

the terms of the 1981 North Carolina permit which contained no color
standard.

Plant officials have argued that it would simply be too expensive for

the company to operate the mill according to a 50 color unit standard.3 51
They claim that it would be necessary to close the plant if forced to do
this. 352 This is not a threat to be taken lightly. Champion employs approximately 2,300 people, making it the state's largest employer west of
Charlotte. 5 3 Studies have indicated that unemployment in the surrounding counties would increase from 6.7 percent to 17 percent if the company stopped operating there.35 4 A plant closure would also have a
devastating effect on local vendors whose profit margins are dependent
upon the business they conduct directly with the mill, as well as retail

stores which provide products and services to the employees of the
plant. 355
348. Id. at 185.
349. The Mountaineer, April 22, 1987, at Al. The 50 color unit limitation downstream of the
Champion Mill was based on EPA's interpretation of North Carolina's narrative water quality standard. North CarolinaEnvironmentalManagement Commission, In the Matter of Request for Variance From Water Quality Standard-Based Effluent Limitations By Champion International
Corporation,Canton, North Carolina:CertificateofService, FinalDecision [hereinafter In The Matter
ofRequest For Variance-North Carolina],at 11 (July 13, 1988), North Carolinan officials took strong
exception to this interpretation. Id. A 50 color unit limitation was also established by EPA at the
North Carolina/Tennessee state line, based upon Tennessee's interpretation of its water quality standard. Id.
350. Champion Int'l. Corp. v. EPA, 850 F.2d 182.
351. The Mountaineer, May 8, 1987, at 9A. The Mountaineer, May 20, 1987, at A-1.
352. The Mountaineer, May 8, 1987, at 9A. The Mountaineer, May 20, 1987, at A-1. Champion's position is that it is already a comparitively low color discharger compared with other mills in
the United States, having spent 25 million dollars between 1959-1985 on wastewater and related
wastewater sludge disposal improvements at the Canton Mill. EnvironmentalManagement Commission, In The Matter of Request for Variance From Water Quality Standard-BasedEffluent Limitations By Champion InternationalCorporation, Canton, North Carolina: Certificateof Service, Final
Decision 3 (July 13, 1988). Champion would propose an 85 color unit standard which would reduce
effluent color loadings from the mill by an average of 50 percent. Id. at 20. A 50 color unit standard
would reduce effluent color loadings by more than 85%. Id.
353. The Mountaineer, May 11, 1987, at IA, 2A.
354. Id.
355. The Mountaineer, May 11, 1987, at IA, 2A. It has been estimated that the plant's closure
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Representatives of the Dead Pigeon River Council do not deny that
the plant's closure would have a devastating impact on the economy of
the area.3 6 However, they claim that Champion, which is among the top
100 industrial firms in the country and ranks fourth among forest sales
companies with more than four billion dollars in annual sales, can more
than afford to clean up the river.35 7 A report commissioned by this group
found that "the closure of the plant would require Champion to make
considerable capital expenditures to replace lost capacity if it hoped to
maintain [its current] market share., 35 8 The report also found that there
would be enormous costs involved for the company in maintaining an
empty unproductive plant.35 9 However well reasoned these conclusions
might be, they have not been effective in persuading people in North Carolina who perceive their very livelihoods to be threatened.
Champion has been quite successful in organizing support for its
position in North Carolina. Hearings conducted by EPA have attracted
thousands of residents, including as many as ten to fifteen percent of the
plant's employees. 3 ° Most North Carolina public officials, including the
Governor and both United States Senators, have stated that the EPA
draft permit should not be enacted.361 Champion has also received substantial backing from the newspapers in the area.362
EPA appears to have, at least in part, yielded to this pressure. On
May 6, 1987, Bruce Barrett, EPA Regional Water Management Director
stated that Champion "isn't going to have to shut down due to pollution
control. ' 363 If Champion could show that it was doing everything economically and technically possible, it could get a variance from the 50
would mean a loss of 500 million dollars from the economy of Western North Carolina. Id. It is also
the largest taxpayer in both Hammond County, North Carolina and Canton, North Carolina. The
company has gone out of its way to ingratiate itself with the local residents. It processes Canton's
sewage at no charge and contributes generously to local civil and charitable organizations. The Tennessean, May 18, 1987, at 1.
356. The Mountaineer, May 11, 1987, at 2A.
357. The Tennessean, May 18, 1987, at 2.
358. The Newport Plain Talk, May 18, 1987, at 2.
359. Id. This would include the cost of paying taxes on the land. Id.
360. The Knoxville Journal, January 21, 1988, at 1. Large rallies were also held in support of
Champion. The Enterprise, May 6, 1987, at 1.
361. Sunday Tennessean, June 28, 1987; The Mountaineer, May 8, 1987, at 9A ("Governor
James Markham accuses Tennessee of applying a Double Standard.").
362. See, eg., The Mountaineer; February 20, 1987, at 5A, which ran a cartoon showing the
Champion Plant closed down. A cute little boy says to his mother,"[I]s that where my dad once
worked?" Id.
363. The Mountaineer, May 6, 1987, at Al.
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color unit standard. 3" Although such a formal determination was never
made, EPA did authorize North Carolina and Tennessee to grant variances from the 50 color unit standard although no final permit has been
issued by the agency.36 On July 13, 1988, North Carolina granted the
variance,36 6 and on January 10, 1989, the Commissioner of the Depart367
ment of Health and Environment of Tennessee denied it.
Under Tennessee law, Champion may appeal the Commissioner's
decision to the Tennessee Water Control Board. 368 If the Board also
renders a decision adverse to the company, appeals can be made, as of
right, to the Tennessee Court of Chancery and, ultimately, to the Tennessee Court of Appeals.3 69 It is likely that this process would take from
four to five years. 7 ° If EPA does issue a final permit which includes the
50 color unit standard, Champion will have the right to a hearing before
an Administrative Law Judge,3 7 1 followed by an appeal to the Fourth
Circuit. It will be a very long time before Champion's pollution of the
Pigeon River is abated.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Title I of the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1972 begins with the
following words: "The objective of this Act is to restore and maintain the
'3 72
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.
After reviewing the legislative history of this extremely important law, it
must be concluded that the above passage aptly expresses the sentiments
of Congress. Justice Powell erroneously asserts in his opinion that Congress wished to establish an efficient regulatory system in which the costs
of achieving a given level of pollution reduction would be balanced
against the benefits. The truth is that Congress' overall priority was the
364. Id.
365. The proposed variance would have established a maximum allowable color standard of 85
units. Environment Management Commission, In The Matter of Request For Variance-North Carolina at 20.
366. State of Tennessee, Department of Health and Environment, Letter To Mr. Richard J.
DiForio, Jr., Vice President,Environmen4 Champion InternationalCorporation, RE: Variancefrom
Water Quality Standard Champion InternationalCorporation,North Carolina (January 10, 1989).
367. In The Matter of Request For Variance-North Carolina 1.
368. Tenn. Code Ann. § 69-3-105(i).
369. If both of these courts ruled against it, Champion could request that the Tennessee
Supreme Court grant it certiori.
370. Telephone interview with Michael D. Pearigen, Deputy Attorney General, State of Tennessee (January 18, 1989).
371. Id.
372. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
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elimination of pollution, however best it could be brought about. At the
time, there was a real concern that this country might be on the verge of
confronting an ecological crisis of catastrophic proportions. Decisive action was needed in the field of water pollution prevention. However, legislators were extremely skeptical that the federal government would ever
possess the needed manpower and resources to administer and enforce
laws in this area effectively. This is why the citizen suit provision was
added to the bill. Accordingly, it cannot be asserted, as the Supreme
Court has, that the "savings clause" was not intended to preserve plaintifrs remedies vis-a-vis the Act as a whole. Why would Congress seek to
preempt the remedies traditionally available to plaintiffs, if it did not believe that the applicable federal statutory laws would be effectively
enforced?
The experience of the downstream plaintiffs in the Ouellette, Milwaukee and Champion cases demonstrates that the Clean Water Act, as
presently administered, is anything but "all-encompassing." There are
substantial gaps in the legislation which can only be filled by traditional
tort remedies. Congress should pass an amendment to the Clean Water
Act explicitly preserving the laws of the affected state. The federal common law of nuisance once might have been the ideal solution, but it is
vague, indeterminate, and potentially ineffective in the hands of a conservative judiciary which has shown no compunction about thwarting
the will of Congress through quite sophisticated, but ultimately specious,
judicial construction.
STEVEN GAYNOR

